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Who cares about corruption in conflict? Afghans do. This dissertation considers the 
intersection of governmental support and corruption during periods of instability. 
Although there are studies connecting popular support to corruption, only a few studies 
have linked an operationalized concept of corruption to instability. None of these have 
attempted to contextualize corruption based on local norms to determine whether their 
definition measures behaviors that would be considered problematic by the populace. 
This case study of Afghanistan provides a unique opportunity to open the black box of 
instability and analyze the impact of corruption on governmental support during an active 
conflict for control of the government. Using two waves of survey data from December 
2008 and March 2009, I first identify the different types of corruption that are viewed as 
a serious problem by Afghans. I find evidence for types of corruption that cause losses 
and emotional duress have a greater negative impact on perceptions of corruption as 
serious problem. I then consider how these particularly salient aspects of corruption 
influence support for the Afghan national government and an external actor, the 
International Security Assistance Force lead by the United States, which requires popular 
support in its efforts to defeat the Taliban insurgency. I find evidence to suggest that 
corruption causes not only diminished support for the government, but can also lead the 
population to switch their support to the opposing side. Finally, I consider the effect of 
government performance, as well as the perceptions of corruption across government 
levels, on support for ISAF and its efforts to resolve the conflict. I find that government 
actions do affect popular opinion of the external counterinsurgent force, especially 
corrupt behavior by agents most closely associated with ISAF.  Further, perceived 
trustworthiness and respect for cultural practices significantly impact support for the 
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external counterinsurgents. These findings have important implications for the priority 
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Opinions are stronger than armies. Opinions, if they are founded on truth and justice, 
will in the end prevail against the bayonets of infantry, the fire of artillery and the 
charges of cavalry. 
 - Lord Palmerston1 
The importance placed on public opinion in irregular warfare cannot be understated. 
Public opinions, “even when not founded truth or justice,” note Meyers and Brysac who 
cite Lord Palmerston in their discussion of the Great Game between Britain and Russia in 
the 19th Century, can still have decisive consequences for the onset and dynamics of war. 
This dissertation considers the intersection of governmental support and corruption 
during periods of instability. Although there are studies connecting popular support to 
corruption, only a few studies have linked an operationalized concept of corruption to 
instability. An in-depth case study of Afghanistan provides a unique opportunity to open 
the black box of instability by analyzing the impact of corruption on governmental 
support during an active conflict for control of the government. It also takes a step back 
to consider whether corruption within the Afghan government also influences support for 
an external actor, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) lead by the United 
States, that continues to require popular support in its efforts to defeat the Taliban 
insurgency. 
Regime Instability and Corruption 
One would expect a corrupt regime to be an unstable one—one that would 
eventually fall under the weight of mismanagement and assorted flavors of favoritism. 
The logic seems straightforward. Regimes lose support due to corruption. At some point, 
the citizens and/or elites become fed up and take action, resulting in reforms, protests, 
																																								 																					
1 Cited in Meyer, K.E. & S.B. Brysac. 1999. Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for 
Empire in Central Asia. Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, p. xxii.  
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regime change and/or conflict if dialogue fails. This period of challenging the incumbent 
government is broadly labeled instability.2 Although the effect of corruption on regime 
stability may seem intuitive, the link has only tenuously been established theoretically 
and empirically.  
For example, the coverage and subsequent analysis of the protests in the Arab 
Spring frequently suggested corruption was at least an underlying cause of the instability. 
In Tunisia, Mohamed Bouazizi had his produce and equipment confiscated for not paying 
a bribe to the local police (Abouzeid 2011). His self-immolation provided the literal spark 
for a wave of unrest attempting to oust a corrupt regime, which spread to surrounding 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Several of the affected countries, most 
notably Libya, Syria and Yemen, remain beset by conflict. The Arab Spring protests and 
the subsequent regime changes appear to validate beliefs that corruption causes 
instability. However, corruption had been high in the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries for decades (Warf 2015), so it cannot be a sufficient condition for 
regime instability. Thus, speculation that corruption will cause instability lacks analytical 
rigor. 
The scholarly community has yet to systematically examine the intersection of 
corruption, regime support and instability. Individually, each of these topics has produced 
a vast literature. Many of the most cited works in comparative politics look cross-
nationally in an attempt to uncover those variables that cause corruption, support for 
regimes, or instability. However, the lack of explanatory power from analyses that rely on 
																																								 																					
2 Political instability for regimes is typically expressed as unconstitutional regime transition, or civil war 
onset in large-N studies (c.f. Goldstone et al. 2010 and, Collier and Hoeffler 2010). There are multiple 
expressions of the ‘overthrow’ process, which represent different events in an attempt to change the regime. 
Protest has also been included as a piece of political instability when looking in greater detail at the process 
of regime change (Snyder and Mahoney 1999, see also Smith, 2004, for a MENA regional statistical 
study).  
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indices and proxy variables for their key concepts is pushing the research community to 
be more introspective about the limits of these cross-national studies. For example, while 
prolific, the regime instability literature has yet to come to consensus about the causes of 
regime change (Geddes 2007, Haggard and Kaufman 2012). The proxies and indices used 
to suggest causal mechanisms do not hold up under scrutiny.3 Recently, Hale (2013) 
suggests that current methodological approaches that use cross-national investigation are 
less helpful when ‘cascades’ from adjacent regimes influence system behavior. At a 
minimum, this concern suggests that the independence of observations required by most 
statistical techniques is violated in these cross-national statistical analyses. In the Arab 
Spring example, a conventional cross-national approach to regime change or civil war 
onset would typically fail to account for the contagion affect that occurred as protest 
spread from Tunisia to surrounding countries.  
A solution explicitly called for by Haggard and Kaufman (2012), and implicit in 
Hale’s (2013) conditions for regime change, is the need to look within each country and 
examine the potential for collective action that may lead to instability and regime change. 
The argument is that using proxy variables for key concepts, such as income inequality or 
corruption, provides, at best, a static snapshot of a dynamic process. Yet, these proxies 
have provided the basis for cross-national comparisons and subsequent causal theorizing. 
As might be expected, these crude proxies for corruption have failed to explain how and 
when events unfold. Rather than assume income inequality or another grievance related 
issue like corruption are important mobilizing issues for collective action, it is necessary 
																																								 																					
3 Reviewing and extending previous work by Boix (2003; 2008) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000; 2001; 
2006), Haggard and Kaufman (2012) began their project by suggesting that current databases are flawed. 
However, they find that a more thorough recoding in a qualitative dataset does not yield more robust 
conclusions and suggests that returning to collective action concerns may yield improved causal 
explanation. 
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to first explore whether and what forms of inequality and/or corruption matter in a given 
country so that we can be more precise in our predictions and explanation. 
The progress of research on conflict and corruption is leading us toward this 
enhanced specificity. There is currently one study (Taydas et al. 2010) that finds 
corruption, especially corruption related to procedural fairness, leads to an increased 
likelihood of civil war onset. Now, if we want to explain the importance of corruption in 
the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, we must first increase the level of specificity for this 
concept as there a number of procedural fairness issues, and other types of corrupt 
behavior, in this highly corrupt state. Which types of corruption explain declining (or 
stable) support for ISAF or the resilience of the Taliban’s ability to mobilize local 
support?  This dissertation begins to provide the specificity necessary to improve 
explanation by probing corruption and determining which aspects are the most salient to 
Afghans. For example, it shows that corruption in the state court system is highly 
problematic and is therefore a likely reason why the Taliban’s shadow government is able 
to mobilize supporters to its cause. The type of survey research used in this dissertation 
bridges the gap between cross-national findings and field research, such as that carried 
out by Farrell and Giustozzi (2013) in Helmand province whose interviews find 
indications of the local popularity of the Taliban’s courts.  
Otherwise, the expansive literature on the effects of corruption suffers from 
challenges similar to the regime change scholarship—evident in the recent review of the 
corruption indices by Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014). The authors find that factors “such as 
economic development, democratic institutions or Protestant traditions bias perceptions 
downward from corruption experience” (p. 309). The level of economic development was 
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often thought to cause corruption, but it independently did not track well with actual 
experience. Further, they find that a country’s geographic and population size bias 
corruption upward: the larger the population the greater the chance for corruption, and 
thus a tendency for a larger absolute number of incidents to increase perceptions of 
corruption prevalence. The results of their review of the field call into question the 
robustness of previous findings on the ill effects of corruption on a range of topics using 
the most popular databases and indexes. Even the most frequently cited link between 
corruption and economic performance has been called into question—since the higher a 
nation’s GDP, the less likely citizens are to perceive the nation to be corrupt (Ibid).4 
A common thread between both sets of literature is the inability for concepts to be 
adequately measured and compared cross-nationally. On this point, Donchev and Ujhelyi 
find that existing indices, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI), may be better 
suited to examine differences among nations with low levels of corruption.5 The utility of 
perception-based indices does not seem to translate to high corruption cases like our case, 
Afghanistan. This is obviously a problem if we want to focus our analysis on the potential 
effects of corruption on regime stability and conflict—with the countries of greatest 
interest or risk being those that fall into the highly corrupt category of nations.  
A further difficultly is noted by Tverdova (2011), who finds that nations 
considered to be the most corrupt displayed a greater gap between elite and public 
perceptions. In high corruption countries, “the public,” she suggests, “may become 
																																								 																					
4 This has a convenient narrative because biased findings toward rich donor countries who would then use 
findings from corruption indexes to force favorable economic reforms (Andersson and Heywood, 2009). 
5 Specifically, they argue, “perception indices exhibit diminishing sensitivity to corruption experience, 
implying that they may be a better proxy for actual corruption in low-corruption countries than in high-
corruption ones” (p. 310).		
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desensitized to the issue and accept corrupt practices as a social norm” (p. 8). Persson et 
al. (2013), on the other hand, suggest that it is not really acceptance of social norms in 
these highly corrupt cases, but rather the difficultly of overcoming the inherent collective 
action problem. The difference in posture is whether the population truly accepts the 
status quo. Tverdova’s interpretation would support explanations that corruption becomes 
a cultural and institutional norm. Persson et al. lend support to beliefs that people would 
abandon social norms if given the opportunity to change the situation (i.e. challenge the 
government).  
One could also argue, as I do in this dissertation, that these authors’ arguments are 
not mutually exclusive, especially when we consider the range of potential behavior that 
could be characterized as corrupt. Types of corruption that are deemed unacceptable can 
exist simultaneously with types of corruption that are viewed as culturally acceptable. In 
such situations, some types of corruption will be accepted as a cultural norm, and will 
therefore not form the basis of collective action challenging the government, but other 
types will undermine support for the government and possibly breed instability and 
conflict.  
Overview 
The starting point for this dissertation is resolving which types of corruption are 
accepted and those that are problematic for regime support. The trouble with existing 
indexes motivated the return to a case study approach. Survey data from Afghanistan 
provides an ideal tool to analyze the primary research question: do different types of 
corruption impact regime and counterinsurgent support during conflict? The Afghanistan 
	 7	
case in late 2008 and early 2009 provides some unique observational opportunities that 
are lacking in the literature since the survey data was collected during active conflict.  
In particular, this dissertation utilizes two waves of the Afghanistan Nationwide 
Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey carried out between 2008 and 2013 by 
ISAF. The surveys were undertaken to assess the attitudes of the Afghan population on 
performance of the Afghan government and the international security forces.  Each wave 
surveyed approximately 8,000 people for a combined N of 16,729.  The scope of the 
instrument was to assess a broad sample of the national population—although it does not 
purport to be nationally representative – some areas of the country are underrepresented 
due to active conflict and the remoteness of many villages. 
Although the survey was administered quarterly during this time period, the set of 
corruption questions was not asked consistently across all waves. I focus, therefore, on 
two waves (December 2008 and March 2009) for which a range of questions regarding 
perceptions of corruption in various institutions, including the court system and sub-
national government, as well as experience with improper acts by members of the police 
force and the national army. 
The survey includes respondents in all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces. Basic 
demographic characteristics of the 16,791 survey respondents are presented in Table 1.1, 
including proportion of males and females surveyed, as well as proportion of major 
ethnic groups. Most of the respondents lived in villages (87.30%) and a majority 
(58.74%) reported having no formal schooling. Fifty percent of respondents identified as 
Pashtun, followed by 27.40% as Tajiks, 7.6% as Uzbek, 6.4% as Hazara and the 
remaining as Turkmen (2.02%), Nuristani (2.21%), Baloch (1.08%), Arab (0.86%), 
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Kirghiz (0.02%), Pashai (1%), Sadat (0.83%), Parachai (0.04%), Bayat (0.27), and Other 
(0.02%). The age of respondents ranges from 15 to 89 with an average of 33 years and 
50% of respondent aged 22-41.  










































































Total	 16,791	 	 16,781	 	 16,791	 	 16,787	
	
I undertake three major investigations in this dissertation in order to answer my 
overall research question. Each attempts to fill a gap in the literature on corruption, 
regime support, and counterinsurgent support in irregular warfare. First, there is generally 
a paucity of data collected during conflict, and none to date that examines the role of 
corruption. Chapter 2 fills this gap, answering the first part of the research question by 
identifying the different types of corruption that are viewed as a serious problem in 
Afghanistan. I find evidence for types of corruption that cause losses and emotional 
duress have a greater negative impact on perceptions of corruption as serious problem. 
The implication for future research is to pay careful attention to the types of corruption 
that are seen locally as problematic rather than adopt a ‘standard’ or international 
conception of corruption. Additionally, in highly corrupt societies, it is necessary to pay 
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attention to measuring citizens’ sensitivity to corrupt acts and how this, in turn, can affect 
areas of public support without necessarily being able to elevate overall perceptions of 
corruption.  Then, the theorized conditions that lay the foundation for regime change and 
civil war onset can be examined here to record elements of support for a regime during 
conflict while considering types of corruption. 
Chapter 3 opens the black box of the transition period to investigate support for 
the regime. I find that, consistent with the literature’s expectations, security plays the 
most important role in maintaining support.  However, I also find evidence to suggest that 
corruption causes not only diminished support, but can also lead the population to switch 
their support to the opposing side.  Future research on this trend would benefit from a 
time-series approach that tracks support regionally so that we have a better idea of the 
magnitude of the loss of support from corruption and the ability of other factors to 
counteract the loss. 
Finally, conditions for support during irregular warfare are argued to be different 
from non-conflict scenarios (Kalyvas 2006), and it brings to the fore the necessity to 
examine the role that an external actor, in this case ISAF, plays in support of the Afghan 
population. Irregular warfare is a term used by Kalyvas to demarcate population centric 
warfare from that fought entirely between two armies. Since the conflict is fought among 
the people—popular support is theoretically still important. Thus, Chapter 4 considers the 
role that government performance and corruption plays in support for the actor 
attempting to resolve the conflict. I find that government actions do affect popular 
opinion of the external counterinsurgent force, especially corrupt behavior by agents most 
closely associated with the counterinsurgents.  I also find that trust for the external force, 
	 10	
and its perceived respect for religion and traditions significantly impacts its popular 
support. 
	 11	
Chapter 2: Establishing country specific baselines for problematic corruption 
The fundamental problem in the corruption and regime stability literature is a tendency to 
refer to an ill-defined concept of corruption being linked to the prospect for system 
turmoil. When scholars turn to existing databases and indexes to operationalize the 
concept they inevitably are forced to narrowly focus on corruption as bribery and 
perceptions of patron client relationships. These types of corruption are not always bad 
for political stability. Some types of corruption may create economic inefficiency, but 
strengthen socio-political ties. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) point out that these patron-
client relationships establish positive linkages between the government and the citizenry. 
Although patron-client relations may result in negative outcomes, such as inequality, it 
may also generate solidarity and facilitate regime stability. For example, neighborhood 
brokers of clientistic goods can play a stabilizing role by limiting social protest or 
mediating disputes (Auyero 2001, cited in Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).6 
Moreover, earlier scholarship on corruption suggested that some corruption might 
serve to improve on the administrative processes of the government (Merton 1968, 
Goldsmith 1999). Therefore, it seems necessary to establish whether there are types of 
corruption that are truly acceptable social norms. An example of such a practice is 
constituency service in an American political context (Philp 2002). This act is considered 
not to be corrupt and is partially legitimized by some scholars as being consistent with 
democracy to provide such services as a process of representation (c.f. Thompson 2000). 
Yet, such behavior would not necessarily be acceptable in other Western countries.  This 
																																								 																					
6 Of course, the value of stabilizing protest in this manner could be normatively debated—especially if one 
views such protest as a mechanism for positive change. However, when it helps build consensus in a 
volatile and fragmented state, such stabilizing actions would be appreciated if it reduced a cycle of 
violence. 
	 12	
practice seems to persist mainly because it is an American democratic tradition. It is a 
cultural view of the acceptability of an act that if witnessed in other countries would 
typically be labeled clientelism—a term associated with backwardness and creating 
economic inefficiencies (Stokes 2007; Hicken 2011).  
To move forward with any research on the potential destabilizing effects of 
corruption, I argue that a baseline should be set for what aspects of corruption are seen as 
problematic in a given country. It is necessary to separate the benign forms of corruption 
that no one cares about from the malignant. Only then can we explore whether corruption 
is truly undermining support for a regime and pushing them toward unstable conflict. As 
a first step, my research question asks what types of corrupt behavior are seen as a 
serious problem in Afghanistan based on two waves of survey data from December 2008 
and March 2009. Unique to this survey instrument are questions that allow respondents to 
document a wide variety of corrupt acts carried out by the police and national army, 
while also examining a number of perceptional questions. The perceptional questions 
asked are often linked to corruption correlates/proxies (like impartiality) found in the 
corruption literature. The Afghan experiences and perceptions can then be analyzed to 
determine if they push corruption to be considered a “serious” problem in Afghanistan. 
This is an important case study because it falls into the category of states that previous 
research acknowledges it does not measure well: the highly corrupt (Donchev and 
Ujhelyi 2014).  
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Defining and Measuring Corruption 
Defining corruption is a complex endeavor. We generally must define it in order 
to measure it. Susan Rose-Ackerman in the International Handbook on the Economics of 
Corruption (2007) notes that corruption is a moral principle of sorts that describes the 
tainting of an ideal. This causes corruption to have a moral/emotional aspect that is 
perceived by groups of individuals, and a more definitive legal side. Not all legal acts 
will be perceived as moral, and not all illegal acts will be perceived to be immoral. 
According to Rose-Akerman, the moral aspects of corruption tended to violate 
economists’ disinclinations to evaluate the goodness or badness of behavior (p. xv).7  
Their response early on was to narrow the definition of corruption to strictly legalistic 
terminology as “monetary payments to agents (both public and private) to induce them to 
ignore the interests of the principals and to favor the private interests of the bribers 
instead” (p. xvi).  This definition appeals to economists, but it may be overly narrow, 
because corruption need not require money to change hands. However, the adoption of 
this definition created a bribe-centric research agenda.  
Today, the prominently used definition of corruption tends to highlight some form 
of “misuse of public office for private gain” (Treisman 2007, Tavits 2010). Another 
commonly used definition originating the World Bank, World Governance Indicators has 
the same core principle, but elaborates on its meaning more. Their definition is that 
corruption “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
																																								 																					
7 And as we will see below, those organizations providing the most common measure of corruption 
approach it from an economic development lens. Therefore, the idiosyncrasies and research focus of 
economists heavily shape our understanding of corruption up to this point. 
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the state by elites and private interests” (Kauffman et al. 2011; p. 4).8  This definition is 
quite broad, and state ‘capture’ is included to measure ‘legal’ forms of corruption—
where, by some standards of fairness or international practice, these actions would be 
deemed corrupt or illegal, but in a particular country it has been rendered legal 
(Kaufmann et al., 2000). In more established democracies with strong institutions this 
state capture is often just a different form of corruption—that which creates an influence 
market where individual interests seek preferential access to lawmakers (Johnston, 2005). 
The nuance adds to a sophisticated discussion on corruption. 
In Judge et al’s (2011) meta-analysis of corruption research, the taking of bribes 
features prominently in the three “most common” measures of corruption.9  These 
instruments limit their experiential data to bribes, but have adjusted perceptional 
considerations to other concepts of corruption such as influence trading, or of clientalistic 
patterns of vote garnering and pork spending—that may or may not also be perceived as 
corruption depending on the national context (Kitschelt 2000; Johnston, 2005). However, 
it is not clear the degree to which any of the existing indexes are able to handle this 
complexity.  
If we were to adopt some version of the standard definition and potentially utilize 
one of the existing indexes that operationalize it, we still would not be able to point to 
which parts of the definition are being measured. The indexes cannot be disaggregated 
into the component parts so that we might have a better understanding of what each is 
measuring. For example, are illegal bribes weighted more heavily than ‘legal’ influence 
																																								 																					
8 This is still the definition for the corruption indicator for the WGI 2014 (as of 2 May 2015; 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc ). 
9 The three “most common” were cited to be: Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI), the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI), and Political Risk Services Group Corruption 
Index (CI).		
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markets? This creates problems for causal explanation because the processes of each are 
driven by different political practices. Numerous articles continue to criticize both 
existing scholarship and corruption indexes on the messiness of cross-national 
approaches to corruption measurement (Anderson and Heywood 2009, Atkinson 2011, 
Brown and Cloke 2011, Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014, Tverdova 2011). If I want to argue 
that corruption leads to regime instability, there is no way of opening the black box that 
the indexes have placed around their corruption measurement in order to see what aspect 
of corruption may be more problematic than another. Nor, could we see whether some 
parts are having a stabilizing effect proposed by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) in order 
to explain confounding factors that keep highly corrupt nations from tipping into 
instability. 
Further, corruption by its nature is something that seeks to avoid detection—as is 
the case with most illegal acts or legal but unfair practices. Some corruption studies show 
that individual corruption cases require many months to years of investigation and legal 
prosecution (Wells, 2012). For this reason, one could question whether we have a 
reasonable chance of creating an accurate measure of corruption when it can be so 
difficult to determine its prevalence. Daniel Kaufmann addresses this skepticism in a 
2006 paper, “Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities.”10  He argues that foremost 
among the ways that corruption can be measured is the “informed views” of relevant 
stakeholders. This is premised on individuals “actual experience” with corruption as 
opposed a mere perception (Kaufman et al., 2006:1). The implication is that individual 
																																								 																					
10	Kaufman headed the development of the World Bank’s Governance and Anti-Corruption section.	
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level surveys of local inhabitants might be the best way to measure levels of corruption.11 
The validity of using public perceptions survey research as a measurement tool has been 
extensively reviewed. The Kaufman World Bank paper and the edited volume by 
Sampford et al. (2006) suggest that survey research is adequate, but other scholars of 
public perception raise important points of consideration.  
Andersson and Heywood (2009) analyzing work done by previous scholars others 
point to a gap between overall perceptions of corruptions and experienced corruption. 12 
However, such critiques fail to account for experienced corruption that extends beyond 
the surveyed period (…in the past 12 months in the TI survey). For example, Andersson 
and Heywood illustrate their point using a comparison between the Czech Republic and 
Ukraine. Ukraine had a much higher percentage of citizens paying bribes but similarly 
high levels of perceived corruption, which they suggest is problematic because perception 
does not appear to be linked to experience. Yet, the Czech Republic still has one of the 
highest rates of bribe payments in that region—and one of the highest examined in 
Eastern European EU states (surpassed only by Romania) averaging approximately 
15%.13  Compounding this percentage over time and considering social ties, many 
citizens will have direct contact with bribe payment and/or personally know someone 
																																								 																					
11 According to public opinion research, one could suspect that public perception is in part influenced by 
the elite discourse external to individual perceptions that has framing or priming effects on their attitudes 
(Chong and Druckman, 2007a, 2007b).   Zaller and Feldman (1992) argue that in order to ground survey 
research in what can be considered true attitudes (“crystallized” attitudes from Converse and Markus, 
1979), researchers should follow three axioms. Relevant to the current discussion is their third axiom that 
considers the accessibility of a given topic to a respondent—is the topic salient to the person at the moment 
of questioning. Thus, someone who as recently experienced corruption will certainly have a salient, 
crystallized attitude, and public opinion surveys would be an adequate tool. 
12 Following up on their source (Weber Abramo, 2007, p. 6), the finding is that no statistical relationship 
was established between individual experience of corruption and their general perception of corruption in 
the TI barometer. More recently Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) confirm this finding.  
13 Taken from a review of Transparency International Corruption Barometer waves from 2004 to 2010.	
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who has. Therefore, the problem may not be that the measurements are wrong, but that 
there is a measurement sensitivity issue when studying highly corrupt countries. 
The influence of the media raises a second corruption measurement validity 
concern in both the public opinion and corruption literature (c.f. Bishop 2004, Heywood 
2007). If corruption perceptions are driving by media impressions and not a more locally 
based experience, there could be the potential for corruption measures to reflect the 
volume of reporting rather the quantity of corrupt acts. The media is thought to be the 
primary driving force behind public perceptions, but one that also reinforces previous 
direct experience with corruption as paying bribes (de Sousa et al., 2012).14 Thus, this is a 
concern that cannot be fully resolved here, but it measurement validity issue should not 
be detrimental to my research. 
In the end, much of this debate on measurement of actual corruption is mooted by 
the fact that political action is driven by preferences that have equal force whether or not 
they derived from a valid source.15  Instead, we should consider what effects are cause by 
corruption perceptions—valid or not. An economic analysis focused on the harms of 
corruption on economic growth may want to look at the market distortions caused by 
different types of corruption—in which case bribery may play an important role. 
However, in this study we are examining what aspects of corruption are driving people to 
perceive it to be a serious problem, which will then allow us to then see if relationships 
exist between it being a serious problem and questions of regime support and stability. 
																																								 																					
14 For this reason, the media is seen as an indispensable check on political power that otherwise could 
engage in corruption with little public scrutiny (Funderburk, 2012; Vogl, 2012). 
15 A similar sentiment can be expressed on other matters of public import like economic performance, 
where it can be difficult for the public to reasonably infer how much credit or blame an incumbent should 
receive for the state of the economy (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Kayser and Wlezien, 
2011).	
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Establishing Problematic Corruption 
Given the concerns that corruption plays an important role in reducing regime 
legitimacy and thereby its stability, there is relatively little research that tests the linkage 
between corruption, regime stability and internal conflict. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) 
examine corruption, measured with the Transparency International CPI, and system 
support to establish a baseline concern that it reduces support for a government. In a 
similar vein, (Linde 2012) looks at a particular type of corruption, procedural fairness, 
and finds that perceptions of procedural fairness “are the most important determinants of 
system support” in post communist EU states (p. 410). Taydas et al (2010) make one of 
the first linkages of quality (defined as impartial, non-corrupt) institutions and its role in 
reducing the onset of conflict. This quality of government as an antithesis to corruption 
seems to cut across a wide range of countries (Rothstein 2011, Gilley 2006). However, 
none of these studies have attempted to establish a local context to better capture facets of 
corruption that are important to the population.16 Instead, they are cross-national studies 
that are problematic because of the cross-national bias discover by Donchev and Ujhelyi 
(2014).  
This case study does use a micro-level analysis by looking at individual responses 
to experienced and perceived corruption. It is necessary to discern which corruption 
issues are truly problematic. Previous work on corruption notes that not all types of 
corruption are perceived to be overly concerning by local citizens. For example, a case 
study on perceptions of corruption in Estonia suggests that “both public officials and 
citizens are more likely to engage in corruption when they do not define corruption as 
																																								 																					
16 Gilley does use individual survey responses from the World Values Survey but uses proxy values that are 
not necessarily directly tied to corruption, but are related to system fairness (i.e. confidence in policy and 
judicial system). 
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wrong, and when they perceive that corrupt behavior is widespread among their peers” 
(Tavits, 2010, 1257). This social learning affect that corruption was not seen as wrong 
did not hold when a person had been extorted. (Ibid, 1274). This suggests two things.  
First, different types of corrupt behavior can be perceived by individuals as more 
or less acceptable. Heidenheimer (1989) suggests that types of corruption can be seen as 
a continuum from black or definitely corrupt behavior that “elite and mass opinion would 
condemn and would want to see punished as a matter of principle” to white or definitely 
not corrupt behavior for which  ”the majority of both elite and mass opinion probably 
would not vigorously support an attempt to punish” (p. 161). The middle area or grey 
area demonstrates some ambivalence by certain segments of the population (Ibid). Other 
research also points out that different sub-populations perceive the same acts to be more 
or less corrupt. For example, politicians may see taking a golf outing from a lobbyist as a 
perk of the job, but voters may perceive this to be wrong (Peters and Welch 1978). In 
these two examples we find potential for debate in the grey area as elite opinion is 
diverging from the mass population. In the first case, Heidenheimer suggests that without 
popular support for elite driven corruption laws it would be difficult to convict someone 
in a court of law as juries would not support the law—thus making enforcement 
unlikely.17 However, in the second instance where elite politician nonbelief in the 
corruption of behavior could still have consequences at election time. 
Second, when corrupt behavior extorts or takes from someone, we should expect 
that to be seen as highly problematic by the person being exploited. These actions go 
																																								 																					
17 Yet, there are other examples of the need for elites to make positive changes. The same chapter 
Johnston’s research shows that certain corrupt acts were tolerated in Chicago until federal actors took 
strong action. Other research has shown the need for policy entrepreneurs to increase the likelihood for 
change of corruption policy (Navot and Cohen 2015). This research is consistent with collective action 
literature on the importance of leadership (Lichbach 1998), and the increasing realization that corruption is 
often a collective action problem (Persson et al 2013). 
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beyond the grey area of impartiality or social acceptability of certain behaviors and 
represent a concrete loss to those who are impacted. Applying this to the Afghanistan 
context, we should expect a divergence of support in cases where elite/official action is at 
odds with public beliefs of acceptable behavior. It is necessary to allow public opinion to 
define proper behavior as the legal code or elite opinion may diverge from what is 
actually deemed to be acceptable.  
Such a definition of corrupt behavior is consistent with a “public opinion” method 
of defining corruption (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002). It differs from other 
approaches that rely on interpretations of the “public interest” or on local legal definitions 
(Ibid.) The problem with “public interest” is with who is defining what the public interest 
should be—where there is a long scholarly tradition of worrying over the cultural-
Western- bias that may be introduced under such a method (c.f. Brown and Cloke 2011). 
The legal definition may seem to be less problematic since local governments are 
adopting the rules. Yet, it is not hard to imagine cases were international pressure has 
ensured that a law has been adopted into the legal code, but there is little support for local 
adherence to the law. The public opinion method is not without problems since we are 
essentially left to ‘define’ corruption by a distribution of the population rather than a 
definition that has definite boundaries. This characteristic does not provide clean 
boundaries, but it does allow for a more nuanced consideration of population attitudes 
toward different behavior. Since we are concerned with public support, then the public 
opinion approach allows us to observe the relationships that exist at an individual level 
and can account for individual variation.  
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Data and Methods 
The data used for this paper is drawn from two waves of surveys conducted by the 
International Security Assistance Force conducted in December 2008 and March 2009. 
The survey is particularly well suited to answer the question at hand because it asks a 
range of experiential and perceptional questions that are potentially considered corruption 
in Afghanistan. 
The dependent variable is perceptions of corruption. Respondents were asked 
whether they `Strongly Agree,’ `Agree somewhat,’ Disagree Somewhat,’ or `Strongly 
Disagree,’ to the following question: “Do you agree or disagree that corruption a serious 
problem in the government?”  Approximately 61% of respondents reported strongly 
agreeing corruption is a serious problem the others stating they: Agree Somewhat 
(26.28%), Disgree Somewhat (7.26%), Strongly Disagree (5.48%).18 I recoded the 
variable into a binary dependent variable with those strongly agreeing that corruption is a 
serious problem coded as 1.  
																																								 																					
18 These proportions are similar to the results of the 2008 and 2009 Surveys of the Afghan people 
conducted by the Asia Foundation. In 2009, 53% of respondents reported that corruption was a major 
problem in their daily lives and 51% reported it to be a major problem in 2008. Sixty-six percent of 
respondents reported the government was doing a very bad or somewhat bad job combatting corruption in 
2008 (68% in 2009); 76% reported corruption being a major problem in the country in both 2008 and 2009, 
63% and 61% in their respective provincial governments in 2008 and 2009, respectively and 53% in local 





 As previously discussed, perceptional questions are one way to measure how 
citizens develop an overall understanding of corruption in their country. The survey 
allows for two important areas of the government to be tested that examines the perceived 
performance of appointed officials, and the state of the national court system. The first 
area is the performance of district and provincial level government leaders. The question 
asks whether an individual believes the provincial and district governor “misuses his 
power?”  Because the executive (the President) appoints provincial and district 
governors, we would expect that their behavior would be linked to the national system of 
governance. Therefore, misuse of power at the provincial or district level should 
negatively impact opinion of the national government’s handling of corruption.19  
Similarly, the second tested variable asks, “Do you believe there is corruption in the State 
																																								 																					
19	While	some	 literature	discuss	political	elite	corruption	 in	a	general	way	(Heywood	2007)	or	 that	




















Court System?”  Belief that there is court system corruption should also increase the 
belief in corruption being a serious problem—but in both cases only to the extent that 
these forms of corruption are considered serious. 
The benefit of using these two variables is their ability to capture blame for 
corruption on political leadership, and thus capture the performance expectation 
investigated in research on political elites and parties. Additionally, targeting the court 
system which would normally process lapses in law serves to capture a range of items 
that individuals would feel should acted upon, but are not. Combined, these two variables 
act as a control on the perceptional dimension of corruption, and allows for experienced 
corruption to demonstrate its relevance. 
Finally, we should account for the perceptional portion of corruption Rose-
Ackerman (2007) describes as a tainting of ideal. In Afghanistan, a number of 
government behaviors could be seen religiously or culturally impermissible, and failure 
to uphold them could be seen as corrupt. The question: Does the government respect the 
religion and traditions of Afghans?” allows us to account for this moral dimension of 
corruption. It also acts to strip moral sentiments from the other variables to arrive at a 
more definitive characterization of the harm to self and interest caused by other 
corruption components. 
Therefore, we turn to the second piece of corruption measurement to determine 
what corruption individuals have personally experienced. These items more firmly root 
the investigation of corruption in informed ‘crystallized’ opinion. While it would be 
difficult to capture every possible corrupt act in a highly corrupt state, having a range of 
possible corrupt behaviors helps tease out the types of acts that are considered truly 
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corrupt. A broad enough range of experienced acts allows for a typology to be established 
that would begin to approximate Heidenheimer’s (1989) spectrum of corruption from 
grey to black.  
 
The survey asks a battery of questions to determine if an individual has seen or 
heard of police or the national army doing improper acts in their manteqa (community). 
There are eight improper acts that could have been experienced: bribes, theft, wrongful 
arrest, harassment, reckless driving, qawm20 partiality, illegal checkpoints, and smuggling 
(See Figure 2.1). Where Heidenheimer does not speculate on psychological principles 
that would drive the characterization of grey and black corruption, I base my typology on 
																																								 																					
20 Manteqa translates to community or people of a shared locality. Qawm is slightly more complex. It could 
roughly translate to tribe or ethnic group, but can be more inclusive to apply to the people living in one’s 

























expectations from prospect theory’s usage in political psychology. The theory is based on 
experimental research by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They found issues to be most 
relevant to political behavior by determining whether there was a gain or loss presented 
by a given situation (McDermott 2004). Losses are seen as more concerning than 
potential gains. Therefore, my typology groups improper acts by the extent to which they 
cause losses to an individual. I group bribes and theft together as they are the most likely 
to ‘cost’ an individual affected.21  
 Next, harassment, illegal checkfees22, and wrongful arrest are grouped together 
since they represent an inconvenience or indignity, but not necessarily a true cost. 
Finally, qwam partiality, smuggling, and reckless driving do not necessarily have a 
negative impact on an individual. Rather, these actions can be more or less culturally 
expected. Based on the loss incurred to an individual, we can expect that first group of 
experiences to impact the perception of corruption the most. The second group may be 
less a corruption issue, and may be more appropriate as a performance issue, and the last 
group may not be considered corruption at all. Alternatively, McDermott points out that 
there is a potential for an emotive calculation in prospect theory though which a 
sentiment affects the decision-making process positively or negatively and there is a 
potential for outweigh the effects of material costs. Therefore, I may find that harassment 
or wrongful arrest is considered more serious that paying bribes. 
																																								 																					
21 In this case, bribes paid to the police and army have no tangible benefits and should be very similar to 
outright theft. This differs from bribes as a type of fee for service that have been seen more positively as 
serving a function to overcome burdensome bureaucracy  (Merton 1968). 
22 Illegal checkpoints/checkfees could be somewhat troublesome as it could either fall into an 
inconvenience category or the loss category. Since, it has the potential to be seen as a fee for service—it is 
a way for the police and army to establish security—it may not be as problematic as an outright demand for 
money, which case an individual could classify it as a bribe. Since bribe is asked first in the list of improper 
acts it is likely that those types of interactions are predominantly captured there.	
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Control variables 
Additionally, Tverdova (2011) suggests the need to control for trust. She points 
out that previous authors (McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Redlawsk and McCann, 2005) 
have pointed that perceptions of corruption and individual trust are related (2011, p. 4), 
but it is difficult to resolve the direction of causality (Ibid., 10). In this case, including a 
trust variable helps parse trust from the other perceptional variables of corruption. For 
example, Ansary’s (2012) history of Afghanistan discusses a general mistrust of Kabul 
ruling elites by rural Afghans. It is necessary to separate a general attitude of mistrust 
from corruption perceptions to have greater confidence that the measure of perception is 
targeting corruption attitudes—and not linked to a more ambiguous sentiment of 
suspicious for government leaders in general. Thus, controlling for trust of the regime, 
better enables us to investigate the component parts of corruption.  
I control for several key demographic factors. Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) have 
recently upheld findings that individual characteristics affect corruption perceptions apart 
from actual experience. Education and age were consistently found to impact corruption. 
Most recently Donchev and Ujhelyi found that as people get older they were less likely to 
perceive corruption. They also find that higher level of education increased the 
perception of corruption. Employment status and income had mixed results, and gender 
had no effect (see Table 7, p. 327). However, because gender roles and identities are so 
prevalent in Afghanistan, it may be more of a factor here. If this proves to be the case, it 
is likely that men would a greater perception of corruption due to women being more 
sequestered at home and less likely to experience or hear about it. This survey can control 
for all expect for level of income since this was not asked, and given that it previous had 
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mixed results presents no serious theoretical or methodological issue with its omission. 
Finally, a district geographic variable is used for to help control variation in regional 
attitudes, and disparities of perception due to factors like level of national level 
government penetration.  
Findings 
Using logistic regression (see Table 2.1), I examine the extent to which factors 
influence the perception that corruption is serious problem. All of the perceptional 
variables (after controlling for trust) affect perceptions of corruption as being a serious 
problem.  
 Table 2.1. Logit Models for Corruption is a Serious Problem 
 
  Model 1 Models 2-5 
Independent Variables Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. 
Age 1.001 (0.002)     
Gender 1.127** (0.049)    
Education 1.013 (0.018)    
District 1.000 (0.000)    
Trustworthy Messaging  1.060* (0.026)    
        
Respect for Religion 1.204*** (0.031) Model 2 
     Doesn't respect at all    Reference Category 
     Doesn't very much respect    .683*** (0.069) 
     Somewhat respects    .904 (0.084) 
     Completely respects    1.269* (0.118) 
        
Police Improper Acts (Y/N) 0.988 (0.044)    
Army Improper Acts (Y/N) 0.876** (0.043)    
        
Corruption in Court System 2.101*** (0.066) Model 3 
     None at all    Reference Category 
     A little    0.976 (0.068) 
     Very much    2.980*** (0.207) 
        
Provincial Misuse of Power 1.195*** (0.038) Model 4 
     Never    Reference Category 
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     Sometimes    1.054 (0.052) 
     Most of the time    1.479*** (0.096) 
        
District Misuse of Power 1.098** (0.036) Model 5 
     Never    Reference Category 
     Sometimes    1.076 (0.053) 
     Most of the time     1.211** (0.080) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
 
Models 2-523 re-estimate Model 1, but disaggregate several of the key categorical 
independent variables as dummy variables for ease of interpretation. Model 4, for 
example, shows that the odds of perceiving corruption as a serious problem are 47.9% 
greater for respondents who believe that the provincial government misuses power ‘most 
of the time’ compared to those who responded ‘never.’ Perceptions of district governors 
misusing power ‘most of the time’ increases the odds that Afghans will see corruption as 
a serious problem by 21.1% over the baseline of attitude that the district governor never 
misuses power.  The relatively large difference in effect across the levels of government 
may be linked to the increased power and autonomy of provincial level governors who 
retain most of the budgetary and executive power in a province, whereas district level 
governors have fairly little power and extremely limited budgets (Evans 2004). Due to 
the corruption literature’s lack of attention of the effect governmental leaders on 
corruption perceptions, this is an important signal that more studies consider its impact. 
 The perceived corruption in the court system has the largest effect on corruption 
being seen as serious. The odds of viewing corruption a serious problem increases by a 
factor of three for someone who believes there is ‘Very Much’ corruption in the State 
Court system compared to those who see no corruption the court system. As expected, 
																																								 																					
23 The five models are fully specified, including all other variables as in Model 1. To simplify the 
presentation of the results, I have omitted the coefficients for the remaining variables.  
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negative experiences with the court system appear to signify a deep concern about the 
state of Afghan governance and the seriousness of corruption. Further, this finding 
probably accounts for the relative popularity of the Taliban shadow court system in 
Afghanistan. Farrell and Giustozzi’s (2013) field research in Helmand Province found 
many elders who appreciated the swift, if harsh, justice provide by the shadow courts. 
They recount one interviewee stating that in order to settle a dispute with someone over 
one jerib of land, you would have to sell 20 to pay the courts (p. 862). Given this 
connection, we would expect tackling corruption in the court system to be a very 
significant issue to focus on in future chapters. 
Contrary to expectations, respondents who believe that the government respects 
religion are more likely to perceive that corruption is a major problem. This result is 
somewhat puzzling, an explanation for which is not immediately apparent. Almost 80% 
of respondents believed that the government somewhat (28.18) or completely (51.63) 
respects religion. Given that most Afghans are devout Muslims and traditionalist, this 
variable may be picking up some underlying factor not accounted for that links the 
salience of these issues to citizens. 
Only the aggregate variable for individuals experiencing corrupt behavior at the 
hands of the Army is significant. However, its effect is in the opposite direction than 
expected—the odds of thinking corruption is a serious problem are 12.4% lower for an 
Afghan who has experienced or observed an act of National Army corruption. Examining 
the full model with all of the police and army incidents included confirms that none of the 
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experienced events are contributing to the population’s view that corruption is a serious 
problem.24  
It appears that the findings of Abramo (2007) and Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) 
that experiences do not significantly affect corruption perceptions are upheld in this case. 
However, as discussed in the theoretical section in relation to Andersson and Heywood’s 
(2009) discussion of the Czech Republic, it may be that people experience so much 
corruption in Afghanistan that these incidents do not register an effect on the overall 
perception of corruption. Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) suggest that in highly corrupt 
countries, individuals may have decreasing levels of sensitivity to the experience of 
corruption. Putting it in Bayesian terms, the individuals have such high priors in their 
expectation to experience corruption, that one more experience (“signal”) makes an 
essentially indistinguishable rise in their perception (“posterior belief”) (p.313).25 
In a similar vein, individuals may have reached the ceiling in the scale of 
measuring the seriousness of corruption—where many already strongly agree that it is 
serious and the additional experience of another corruption event is unable to push them 
up any higher. Given this possibility, I run the full corruption incidents model against a 
government performance dependent variable using a logistic regression that will be 
covered in depth in the next chapter. There was greater variation is responses to this 
question, with the mode of responses being in the center of the scale when asked: ‘How 
well does the government do its job overall?’  Therefore, given that one of the corruption 




25	This	Bayesian	 thinking	does	 suggest	 that	 the	 corruption	perception	questions	are	able	 to	 inform	
our	understanding	of	factors	contributing	to	Afghan	priors	on	corruption.	
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ceiling effect as a reason why it does not impact the dependent variable. (See 
Government Performance model in Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2. Full Incident Models for Corruption Problem and Government 
Performance  
    Corruption   Government Performance       
Independent Variables  Odds Ratio (S.E.)  
Odds 
Ratio (S.E.) 
Age  1.001 (0.002)  1.000 (0.002) 
Gender  1.114* (0.048)  1.030 (0.044) 
Education  1.014 (0.018)  1.083*** (0.019) 
District  1.000 (0.000)  1.000 (0.000) 
Trustworthy Messaging   1.06** (0.026)  1.236*** (0.031) 
Respect for Religion  1.210*** (0.031)  1.225*** (0.032) 
Police: Bribe Taking  0.994 (0.054)  0.838** (0.047) 
Police: Theft  0.971 (0.078)  0.655*** (0.058) 
Police: Wrongful Arrest  0.874 (0.068)  0.834 (0.066) 
Police: Harassment  1.102 (0.075)  0.906 (0.062) 
Police: Illegal Checks and 
Fees  1.238 (0.140)  0.954 (0.106) 
Police: Reckless Driving  1.040 (0.066)  0.993 (0.062) 
Police: Qawm Partiality  0.877 (0.100)  0.914 (0.106) 
Police: Smuggling  1.276* (0.159)  0.798 (0.102) 
Army: Bribe Taking  0.685*** (0.060)  0.843 (0.077) 
Army: Theft  0.886 (0.115)  0.798 (0.113) 
Army: Wrongful Arrest  0.799** (0.069)  0.801* (0.075) 
Army: Harassment  1.019 (0.099)  0.742** (0.076) 
Army: Illegal Checks and 
Fees  1.085 (0.173)  0.901 (0.145) 
Army: Reckless Driving  1.078 0.073  1.044 (0.070) 
Army: Qawm Partiality  0.972 (0.135)  1.041 (0.148) 
Army: Smuggling  1.042 (0.168)  1.073 (0.173) 
Corruption in Court System  2.08*** (0.065)  0.899** (0.028) 
Provincial Misuse of Power  1.202*** (0.039)  0.674*** (0.022) 
District Misuse of Power   1.088** (0.036)   0.853*** (0.028) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
Here we see that both the loss (police bribes and theft) and inconvenience (Army 
wrongful arrest and harassment) incident variables cause a reduction in the belief that the 
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government is doing its job well.26  Police bribes decrease performance evaluations by 
16.2% compared to the baseline of not paying a bribe, and 34.5% reduction for theft, 
suggesting that the intensity of the corrupt act (merely paying a bribe versus out right 
theft) affects performance evaluations. The significance of Army wrongful arrests and 
harassment that was initially theorized to be an inconvenience, may actually display 
stronger negative emotive connections causing individuals to decrease the odds of seeing 
government performance as good by 19.9% and 25.8% respectively. The fact it is a 
greater issue with the Army than the police may also indicate that being confronted by 
the Army (likely under the pretext of supporting the insurgency) would be more 
traumatic than a similar confrontation with the police. 
Conclusion 
 My research question asked what types of corruption are seen as serious problems 
in Afghanistan. The findings here suggest that court system corruption and national 
government appointed regional leaders’ misuse of power is a serious problem among 
Afghans. While it initially appeared that the experience of corruption is inconsequential 
to the overall perception of corruption, an alternate model showed that these incidents do 
affect perceptions of government performance. The implication for research on 
corruption in countries considered to be highly corrupt is the need to consider the 
dependent variable carefully, since an already high level of negative public perceptions 
may thwart efforts to properly estimate the effect of independent variables. Otherwise, 
the re-specification of the dependent variable to government performance allowed for a 





evidence that Afghans do differentiate between grey and black corruption, and that 
merely considering in importance of loss in prospect theory may underappreciate the 
emotional importance of corrupt state actions. Further research is warranted on 
developing a more robust corruption typology with surveys specifically design for the 





Chapter 3: Popular Support in conflict 
Regime legitimacy, understood as popular support, is fundamental to fighting irregular 
wars, such as the current civil wars in Libya and Syria, and the ongoing insurgencies in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007), for 
example, states that legitimacy is the “main objective” in winning these conflicts and 
having the government resume effective control of the state (p. 1-21). Since these 
irregular wars are fought among the population, the support the population is willing to 
provide the government and allied security forces can facilitate uncovering insurgent 
networks and defeating the insurgency. Conversely, if the government is perceived to 
perform poorly the population can withhold active support and make it easier for anti-
government factions to avoid detection. 
 Beyond its importance in irregular warfare, legitimacy has been highlighted as 
important for state building (c.f. Fukuyama 2004). In national policy discussions, 
specifically regarding post-conflict development, legitimacy is viewed as playing a 
prominent role in returning the state to a functioning rule of law. 
 Legitimacy suggests that the governed have given consent to the authority of the 
government and will, therefore, largely abide by the rule of law. However, high levels of 
state corruption in which officials circumvent the rule of law for personal gain, make it 
likely that individual citizens will do the same. It makes for a thorny dilemma for national 
policy executives from donor countries. For example, the 2009 U.S. Agency for 
International Aid’s (USAID) “Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries,” 
discusses a “key” trade-off between urgent assistance and reinforcing the legitimacy of 
the government being assisted. USAID would like to provide needed development 
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funding to support the improvement of social services, but large injections of cash 
provide incentives for still corrupt state sectors to continue to violate the rule of law. 
Agencies, like USAID, must decide whether to provide immediate assistance based on 
urgent need with the knowledge that part of the assistance will be siphoned off by 
government officials. The dilemma, however, is that providing assistant may have more 
severe consequences, beyond perpetuating a corrupt system, for public support and long-
term political stability.  
In an irregular warfare setting, support is undercut by this type of government 
corruption. The parts of the society that would have benefited from the international 
assistance observe, or perceive, that elites are embezzling at least part of this assistant for 
personal gain. The government needs the population to follow the law and report 
transgressions by groups seeking to overthrow the regime. Yet, the government’s failure 
to follow the rule of law erodes public support, and ultimately the rule of law. In the 
context of irregular warfare, this can mean citizens aiding antigovernment forces, 
through, for example, smuggling arms to insurgents, rather than aiding government forces 
and its supporting forces, ISAF.  
Although there has been large literature examining legitimacy as various 
dimensions of support through survey research (see e.g., Norris 1999, 2011, Mishler and 
Rose 2002, Booth and Seligson 2009), this research has limited applicability for 
exploring the stability of regimes based on levels of support in countries that are 
experiencing periods of instability or conflict. The literature has focused more on 
consolidated Western democracies or on states whose regime support is not being 
actively challenged. This limits the utility of existing understandings of popular support 
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and regime stability for explaining how more challenged states are affected by popular 
support. Przeworski (1986, 1991), for example, sharply criticized previous research 
linking regime stability and legitimacy. In particular, he argued that this purported 
linkage of legitimacy to regime stability is tautological since regime change is taken as 
evidence of the illegitimacy of the previous regime. Additionally, he argues that if there 
is no alternative for the population to support other than the regime currently in power, 
the test of the relationship is hampered by a lack of choices. One implication of 
Przeworski’s criticism is the need to examine public support for governments, and the 
factors that influence it, during periods of instability in order to clarify, theoretically and 
empirically, the impact of support on stability.  
Afghanistan (circa early 2009) provides a good case to explore popular support, 
and the important issues and factors that increase or decrease support for the government, 
during a period of instability and conflict. As one of the poorest, most corrupt countries 
in the world, the case of Afghanistan contrasts well with previous work on regime 
support and stability. Moreover, the study provides an important opportunity to satisfy 
Przeworski’s concern that there be an alternative (i.e., Afghans have a choice of groups to 
support). The active conflict between the national government and the Taliban means that 
the population is choosing between two sides – even if neither choice is particularly ideal. 
Thus, this paper contributes to the literature by evaluating evidence of the dimensions of 
public support during periods of open conflict. I examine the relevance of different 
factors of specific and diffuse support using two waves of a nationally representative 
survey conducted by the U.S. military in Afghanistan in December 2008 and March 
2009.  
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Legitimacy as Support 
While some sources in the literature has often pointed to legitimacy as the source 
of regime stability, its exact meaning is difficult to pin down. Both counterinsurgency 
texts (c.f. US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007) and regime stability 
scholarship (c.f. Huntington 1968) point to the need for a legitimate government to 
provide the raison d’être for support of the governed. However, more recent scholarly 
work has moved away from theoretical usage of legitimacy because of the conceptual 
messiness of the term (Levi 2005; Buttorff 2011). Where the policy and the scholarly 
community begin to converge on this topic is the linkage of legitimacy to support for the 
regime by the people under its authority. Most scholars begin with Easton’s theoretical 
elaboration of legitimacy as support—which is manifested as specific and diffuse support 
(1965, 1975). Specific support refers to attitudes about the performance of the state and 
its officials in the short and medium term. More abstract diffuse support refers to the 
opinions of the nation-state as an institution and a person’s identification with the set of 
state institutions. Two of the most recent and widely cited works on support are Norris 
(2011) and Booth and Seligson (2009). Both use survey data to identify components of 
support first laid out by Easton. Implicit in much of the work is the expectation that as 
support wanes, the risk of instability increases.  
Booth and Seligson (2009) suggest that dimensions of support must be established 
for the country in question. This means that a standard list of items should not be 
assumed to matter in every context. Additionally, Buttorff’s (2011) reexamination of 
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legitimacy, using Stinchcombe’s (1968),27 suggests that diffuse support may be 
composed of different elements or dimensions than those Norris and others identify in 
European and Western democracies. In fact, it is likely that norms and doctrines, 
underlying elements of diffuse support, are precisely those variables that are context 
dependent. It is also unknown whether the factors of government performance normally 
related to specific and diffuse support in stable democracies will remain relevant in 
irregular warfare. Similar to this dissertation’s treatment of corruption in Chapter 2, I 
argue that establishing the elements of support by case is necessary to understand the 
likelihood of citizens remaining ‘compliant’ to a government’s rule. Since the 
population’s compliance to the incumbent government in irregular warfare settings is 
seen as a paramount condition for success, an empirical approach is more appropriate to 
determine the extent of support for the government, and the determinants of it.28 
Following Buttorff’s (2011) extension of Stinchcombe’s conceptualization of 
legitimacy, this paper explores a state’s ability to secure the support of the population. In 
Stinchcombe’s Constructing Social Theories (1968), he defines legitimacy as: “A power 
is legitimate to the degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is 
justified, the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as reserves in 
case of need, to make his power effective” (p. 162). Buttorff posits that centers of power 
can fall into three main categories: institutions, social groups, external (non-domestic) 
																																								 																					
27 Stinchcombe’s definition of legitimacy is as follows: “A power is legitimate to the degree that, by virtue 
of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified, the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers 
of power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective” (162).  
28 There are also normative approaches to legitimacy (Ansell 2001). A normative approach would seek to 
determine whether by some set of values a government is legitimate. For example, in Norris’s research, the 
normative question under consideration is the extent to which a government upholds democratic values, 
seeming to equate legitimacy with democracy.	
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actors (2011, 33). She cautions that we should not focus only on social groupings, but to 
consider centers of power inherent to institutions such as the courts and military.  
Buttorff (2011) revives Stinchcombe’s usage of legitimacy to allow for more than 
popular support to drive our understanding of legitimacy. She finds that at the outset of 
conflict, the support of one center of power (typically the military) is sufficient to ensure 
the stability of a regime. This is sufficient at the onset of conflict, but what happens after 
the onset of irregular warfare?  In these cases, the military power has been divided 
amongst factions, and the irregular war, by definition (Kalyvas 2006), is being conducted 
amongst the population. The military was not necessarily sufficient to ensure stability, 
and the logic for warfare has shifted to other political domains. One could argue the main 
“center of power” is the territory’s population during a conflict characterized by irregular 
warfare. Thus, we have to readjust our analysis to examine population support with two 
military factions with coercive power vying for control of the state.29 
In Afghanistan, we have moved beyond whether a center of power can be called 
upon to a period where the centers have been called on to support (or not) the 
government. Therefore, we know that the Afghan courts, legislature and military have 
sided with the national government, and that an external actor (a military coalition headed 
by the United States) has mobilized to support the government. The remaining question is 
the extent to which the final center of power—the population—will lend its support to the 
government. Additionally, a new question is presented. Is the coalition of powers 
assembled that has come to aid the government one that makes the final center willing to 
also support the government. Whether a regime can call upon this center of power is an 
																																								 																					
29 The introduction of coercive power is important because can potentially trump other support items. 
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empirical question that I am exploring here by examining the factors that make individual 
Afghans more prone to support the government. 
The body of literature on local popular support tends to view the ‘population’ in 
an abstract sense, which can suggest homogeneity. Yet, in reality the ‘population’ is 
likely to be fractious. For example, Booth and Seligson (2009) suggest that supporting 
elites may be found among security forces, media, business and external actors. 
Therefore we should expect some heterogeneity between the citizens and elites, or along 
other lines of cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Stinchcombe is able to handle these 
divisions by recognizing that norms and doctrines provide the basis for the coalescence 
and organization of support, which can differ across ethnic and religious affiliations, and 
influence whether the government can obtain passive or active support from specific 
groups. Thusly, we might need to conceptualize population “centers of power” to provide 
a more fine-grained view of those divisions, which comprise the larger abstract center of 
power, represented simply as ‘the population.’  Research in Western democracies, where 
survey data is plentiful, scholars are able to parse these dimensions to yield an impressive 
level of detail.30 
Rather than focus on determining the subgroupings in the population center of 
power, this work simply assumes that the population is a center of power, and takes the 
individual (surveyed) member as the unit of analysis, while controlling for available 
demographic variables. The approach is consistent with how irregular warfare is often 
viewed as the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of these individuals (Berman et al 2011). 
There is potential for concern with this formulation. One could argue this is a ‘Western’ 
reading of the importance the individual in society. Yet, other social systems may operate 
																																								 																					
30 …in order to, for example, better understand voter support (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). 
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on different, less individualistic systems, which make the individual as the unit of 
analysis problematic. Iraq could be one such case, where tribal sheiks tend to, more or 
less, control blocks of individuals and would be able to guarantee support apart from the 
individual nuances found within the tribe (Mcallister 2005).31 This is not the case in 
Afghanistan where tribal affiliations are fractious, capricious, and contingent on 
individual preferences and opportunity costs. The egalitarian nature of tribal politics in 
Afghanistan is often suggested as a major obstacle to consolidating the authority of a 
central government (Barfield 2010, Ansary 2012). It is difficult to read a work on 
Afghanistan that does not cite a local Afghan saying “me against my brothers; my 
brothers and me against our cousins; my brothers, cousins, and me against the world” 
(Barfield 2010, p. 78). It makes strong claims about tribal or ethnic preferences 
problematic.32  However, it makes the findings based on individual survey responses less 
so. This means that an individual focus is appropriate for this study of Afghanistan. Yet, 
there are still elaborate customs for cooperation and the potential for coalition building so 
as to not make the level of individualism incompatible with unity under a centralized 
government.  
Dimensions of support 
Easton (1965, 1975) disaggregates support into two categories: specific and 
diffuse support. Specific support resulting from government outputs is based on the 
citizens’ receipt of the outputs and the perceived responsibility for the bringing of those 
outputs to fruition. Whether those institutions or an individual actually provided the 
																																								 																					
31 For someone studying a society with this sort of tribal dynamic, you could alternatively argue that the 
individuals attitudes and preferences would begin to conform to the leader’s preferences. 
32 Here is another formulation: “It’s me against my brothers, it’s me and my brothers against our cousins, 
it’s we and our cousins against the invader”  (Ansary, 2012, 12). In this light it is more clear why Lyall et al 
(2013) can assert an ethnic effect on levels of support, specifically because foreign forces are an outgroup 
which individuals are willing to fight…but would fails to assert greater within group effects.	
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outputs does not matter since the causal relationship we are attempting to observe is 
between attitudinal support and the perceived receipt of political outputs. Research on 
economic performance and popular support confirms that perception matter more than 
independent sources of economic data (c.f. Evans and Whitefield 1995).33 Diffuse 
support has typically been equated with democratic values among the population that 
have been established in the population’s psyche.  
That a regime may still enjoy some support even without the provision of specific 
outputs is then explained by diffuse support. Easton (1965) points to a “reservoir of 
favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which 
they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (p. 273). 
Simply put, legitimacy or general support is upheld even when dimensions of specific 
support appear to be underperforming (i.e., when individuals are unhappy with the 
government’s handling of the economy are, nevertheless, still supportive of the system).34  
 Afghanistan could be considered a new democracy without a strong tradition that 
should allow for continued popular support despite poor specific support.  Yet, it does 
maintain diffuse support. We might account for this disparity in two ways. The first is 
that the norms and doctrines underpinning the current Afghan government do not rely on 
solely on a democratic heritage for its diffuse support. Secondly, the alternative to the 
current government could be seen as less likely to meet support requirements (for both 
specific and diffuse support) than an underperforming current government. 
																																								 																					
33 This avoids the necessity to introduce data/variables from outside sources related to economic data or 
violence levels, which given the poor quality of government collection of data makes it a more reasonable 
approach in Afghanistan.  
34 The relationship between specific and diffuse support has come under increased scrutiny since long 
periods of poor or declining specific support appear to not have undermined diffuse support, even where 
there should be rather a shallow reservoir of favorable attitudes, as in new democracies (Booth and 
Seligson 2009; Norris 2009).		
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In order to examine these issues, we must return to conceptualizing and 
measuring specific and diffuse support. Norris (2011) follows Easton’s dichotomy but 
suggests that they might be viewed as a continuum rather than a strict dichotomy. She 
examines five component indicators of system support. At the diffuse level, we might 
evaluate national identities and approval of core regime principle and values. For specific 
support, we can determine citizens’ confidence in the regime, regime performance, and 
approval of incumbent office holders.35  Booth and Seligson (2009, esp. Ch. 2) add an 
additional dimension to create six component dimensions: evaluating support for local 
government (as opposed to the central government alone). The works of Norris and 
Booth and Seligson concern with values and democracy are consistent with the regime 
transition literature within which they are nested. Yet, they are inadequate to fully 
evaluate regime support during conflict because factors like security play a more 
prominent role. 
Support in conflict 
There is not much evidence for what aspects of government are the most relevant 
for support during conflict. Under normal conditions, non-conflict conditions, we have 
evidence that the quality of governance predicts support of the population for the regime 
(Rothstein 2011). However, this notion of “quality” is typically left out of discussions of 
governments in conflict. Instead, there is a focus on providing security and ‘essential’ 
																																								 																					
35 See Norris (2011) figure 2.1 for a graphical representation of the indicators of system support. She places 
evaluations of “overall performance” of the regime closer to diffuse support than confidence in regime 
institutions. This works because her description assumes attitudes on the functioning of democracy rather 
than other outputs of performance—such as economic policy, which seems like it would be closer to 
specific support concerns than confidence of the regimes institutions. These two indicators are likely to be 
closely related and the causal direction and relative importance would be difficult to determine. The usage 
in this paper would push these performance related indicators closer to specific support especially because 
there is little historical experience for the population draw upon other than the most recent performance 
indicators. 
	 44	
services. There is little debate over the primacy of security. Kalyvas (2006) has shown 
that most other factors are only of secondary concern. The policy community’s focus on 
government provision of services during conflict (see e.g., Dziedzic et al 2008) has begun 
to receive some criticism in a recent edited volume (Gventer et al 2014). Thus, the 
fundamental elements of support currently subject to debate. The results of this chapter 
contribute to this ongoing discussion in helping to illuminate those areas of governance 
that are essential to maintaining specific and diffuse support during this period of conflict 
in Afghanistan. In particular, this chapter examines whether institutional performance, 
among other factors, affects diffuse support during an irregular warfare setting.  
Other concerns in the literature highlight that the exact components of support are 
contingent or contextual. This means that the essential components are culturally relative 
and have dynamic properties that change over time—like during the course of a war. 
Kalyvas (2006) highlights this in his work by pointing out the support of the population 
will ebb and flow throughout the duration of conflict. This contingency bedevils cross-
national comparisons. Scholars have addressed this problem by focusing on conflict 
onsets (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Weidmann 2009) and 
occasionally on the conditions bringing conflicts to a close (Connable and Libicki 2010; 
Cronin 2009). The first set of statistical findings has weak causal explanations whose 
mechanisms do not help in prediction of future onsets (Haggard and Kauffman 2012). 
The latter two works use process tracing to provide a more robust exploration of potential 
causal processes/mechanisms for ending conflict. 
This paper provides a case study that bridges these two types of research. It is 
unique in that survey data was collected amidst conflict and this allows us to apply some 
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statistical rigor to other scholarship. These observations can provide partial explanations 
for the course of conflict in general (theoretically) and to specific observations on the war 
in Afghanistan. Thus, this paper is limited in its scope and ambition. It can only provide 
evidence of components of public support that exist during a small window of time (i.e., 
December 2008 to March 2009). Yet, it does help illuminate the nature of support in 
Afghanistan at that time and could help with the triangulation of broader observations by 
past and current scholarship. The most important contribution to the literature is its ability 
to provide evidence to support discussion of what legitimacy might be within 
Afghanistan—allowing us to recognize the contours of the ‘centers of powers’ and most 
importantly the articulation of the relevant ‘doctrine and norms’ that underpin legitimate 
governance in Afghanistan. 
Data and Methods 
The data used for this paper is drawn from two waves of surveys conducted by the 
International Security Assistance Force conducted in December 2008 and March 2009. 
Further information about the survey can be found in the introduction chapter. There are 
two questions available to gauge the level of support for the Afghan government. The 
first question is: “Do you believe the Government of Afghanistan is going in the right 
direction or wrong direction?” Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of responses with 
49.11% believing that the government is going in the right direction. This variable is 
recoded as binary dependent.36   
																																								 																					
36 Dichotomizing this question, I group “Wrong direction” and “Same place, not going anywhere” together, 
as this latter response suggests a negative connotation. 
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The second questions asks: “How well does the Government of Afghanistan do its 
job overall?”37 Figure 3.2 presents the proportion of respondents falling within each 
possible response category. Our main focus will be on the first question because it allows 
for respondents to consider the country’s direction as a whole rather than just ask about a 
current assessment of performance. It should also allow for the respondent to consider 
their local, provincial, and national experiences and express any forward-looking 






















However, the second question more closely resembles Norris’s (2011) analysis of 
attitudes toward democratic performance.38  A second regression will be run on the 
second question to allow for a comparison and validity check. We should expect the two 
models to return similar results. 
Control Variables 
This study controls for the typical battery of demographic variables of age, 
gender, and education that Norris (2011) identifies as being commonly associated with 
political attitudes. In regard to the effect of gender, a regime will likely garner more 
female support if it were seen as increasing female equality. In the Afghan case, the 
previous regime placed severe constraints on the freedom of women, and women have 
much greater equality under the current government than under the Taliban. It is also 
likely that women would have much less if the Taliban regained control. Therefore, it is 
																																								 																					
38 Booth and Seligson approach their regime support research differently by focusing on component 



















likely that women will be more likely to support the government. Additionally, 
Afghanistan’s education allows for individuals to attend either traditional schools or 
religiously oriented schools (madrassas). We can examine whether the type of education, 
as well as the level of education, influences support since the survey asked about both 
types of education. Given that the Taliban draws its recruits from madrassas, and is seen 
as more religiously conservative (Rasid 2008), we might expect that greater madrassa 
education may reduce support for the Afghanistan government. This survey does not 
include an income variable, however, I use a proxy question that asks: “Do you think the 
conditions of your life will improve, worsen or stay the same?” If a person’s conditions 
are improving, it should reflect positively on regime support.  
Key variables 
At the level of diffuse support, both Norris and Booth and Seligson use measures 
to establish feelings of nationalism, and specifically whether the individual feels proud to 
belong to a given country. A lack of national identity can signal disaffection with the 
regime, and reduced levels of support. In this survey, respondents were asked: “How 
would you identify yourself first?”  The possible responses were: (1) By my nationality; 
(2) By my ethnicity; (3) By my tribe; (4) Other; and (5) As a Muslim. This variation 
targets questions raised by historical analysis that, on one hand, represents Afghanistan as 
a fragmented, Muslim, and tribal society that has changed little since the 1800’s, and, on 
the other, an Afghanistan that was relatively unified under Durrani rule (Barfield 2010, 
Jones 2010, Ansary 2012). Thus we can gauge respondent’s self-identification as an 
Afghan or to some other societal cleavage. Interestingly, 75% of the population self-
identify as Afghans first and foremost.  
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One might guess this results from the oversampling of more urban areas, but this 
is not the case as the majority of respondents were drawn from rural villages (See Table 
3.1 and Table 1 in the introduction chapter). Further, historical accounts would also 
suggest that rural inhabitants would be much more inclined to self-identify along tribal or 
religious lines—which also does not appear to be the case. We could still expect that an 
Afghan rural-urban split would reduce support for a government if a respondent feels the 
Kabul-based government does not represent rural concerns. 
 
Table 3.1 Self-Identification vs. Geographic Area 
  Village Town City Metro (Kabul) Total 
Nationality 75.28% 79.09% 86.69% 81.74% 12,739 
Ethnicity 12.88% 15.56% 6.81% 11.58% 2,106 
Tribe 3.92% 1.46% 0.91% 1.55% 596 
Other 2.18% 1.46% 1.36% 2.63% 356 
Muslim 5.25% 2.43% 4.24% 2.51% 825 
Total 14,506 617 661 838 16,622 
 
As an independent variable, the urban-rule split is portrayed as historically 
important in the Latin American cases examined by Booth and Seligson, where economic 
development and wages fluctuated as countries shifted from agricultural to more 
industrial economies. In Afghanistan, similar variation in the urban-rule split along 
economic lines has existed, but Barfield (2010) also points to a political elite with little 
ties to rural communities. Thus, we might expect that individuals in rural villages would 
have reduced support for the national government.39 In Afghanistan, it is also important 
																																								 																					
39 Typically, regime support related studies examine individual commitment to democracy in order to 
examine an additional aspect of diffuse regime support. We do not have the luxury of using the same 
question here, but it is not clear that we should given the state of conflict and the re-establishment of 
elections only in 2004. 
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to control for regional variation to capture the extent of governmental penetration and 
resources. I control for this by including a district level variable in the regression.  
In addition, I control for important societal cleavages that may be influencing 
support for the Afghan nation government. Some groups may perceive that the Afghan 
government treats certain groups of individuals poorly and are therefore less likely to 
support it. A traditional cleavage in the literature on conflict is ethnicity (Horowitz 1985). 
Including ethnicity allows us to evaluate the extent to which certain ethnic groups are 
more or less prone to support the government.40 Another potential cleavage is religion. 
Booth and Seligson (2009) have greater variation on the religion dimension in the 
countries they study, where individuals can identify as Catholic or Protestant. The vast 
majority of the population is Muslim in Afghanistan so including religious identification 
does not offer any variation. As one of the ‘doctrines of legitimacy’ expected by 
Stinchcombe and Buttorff, religion is potentially a strong base of support for the 
insurgents who want to return the government to greater religious conservatism. Several 
authors have noted that rural communities in Afghanistan are more religious than the 
Kabul based ruling elite (Rashid 2008, Barfield 2010, Ansary 2012). The question “Does 
the government respect the religion and traditions of Afghanistan” offers a good proxy 
for the importance placed on religiosity by individuals. However, the inclusion of respect 
for “traditions” in the question wording makes it difficult to determine whether the 
religious or traditions component is the more prominent driver of support. 
Finally, Norris (2011) considers trust an important measure of diffuse support for 
																																								 																					
40 In some cases ethnicity may be related to patronage networks that might be considered a specific support 
consideration (c.f. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), Yet, the way ethnicity is used in Lyall et al. a suggests 
sociologically abstract basis of support (i.e. homophily (McPherson et al 2001)—which suggests a more 
diffuse level of support, rather than the material benefits resulting from a specific ethnic connection. 
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a regime. Less trust in the institution is expected to reduce support for the government. It 
allows for diffuse support when specific support performance falls short of expectations. 
Trust is essential to getting citizen support without coercion and facilitates the 
consolidation of democracy. Mishler and Rose (1997) point out that this is essential for 
democracies, especially because they cannot rely on coercion. Since Afghanistan is a new 
democracy, levels of trust should be even more important as it has not built up a reserve 
of trust. The Afghan government is working against its history on this point as rural 
Afghans eyed Kabul elite with distrust (Ansary 2012). This survey instrument provides a 
question that can be used a proxy for general trust. It asks: “How trustworthy do you 
think the messaging is of the government?”  
Specific Support 
The classic example of specific support is the degree to which economic 
performance drives individual support for the government—just as it is prime 
consideration for party support or voting behavior. The extent to which individuals 
believe that economic improvement occurs under a regime, the more likely they are to 
support that government. This is measured with the question: “how well does the 
Government of Afghanistan do its job in improving the economy?” A related question, 
“How well does the Government of Afghanistan do its job in development and 
reconstruction in Afghanistan?,” allows for support to be a function of the government’s 
ability to manage international donations, a highly salient issue in Afghanistan, to rebuild 
infrastructure damaged during the war.  
The existence of conflict brings to the fore issues that are taken for granted in 
survey research in nations without open warfare. We must reach back to Weber and 
	 52	
Hobbes to reestablish a population’s expectation that the government provide them with a 
baseline of security. This is a different branch of scholarly inquiry that is not normally 
incorporated into the regime support and transition literature with its concern for 
democratic attitudes. The theoretical expectation and empirical results in the literature are 
that the population will support the group, whether the incumbent government or 
insurgent faction(s), which provides security to and/or controls the population. This has 
been argued to play such an important role that it can negate all other considerations of 
support (Kalyvas 2006).41 Thus, we examine the effect of perceived security, measured 
by a self-report of security in an individual’s immediate locale, on respondents’ 
assessments of government performance and direction.   
More recent research examines support for regimes based on the quality of 
governance, which ultimately includes the level of corruption . Rothstein (2011), for 
example, includes accounts for the quality of governments by including a measure of 
corruption within governing institutions. By doing so we begin to measure a perceived 
gap (or lack there of) between the values of society and the individual and institutional 
failure to live up to these expectations. Including a measure of corruption as an element 
of support allows for the population to reflect on the perceived performance of governing 
officials without necessarily identifying the underlying components, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, driving feelings of a government being corrupt.42 
Findings 
Both dependent variables return very similar results with a few notable 
differences (See Table 3.2). It appears that the government direction model does tend to 
																																								 																					
41 See Chapter 4 for expanded discussion  on this point.  
42 (However, see Chapter 2 for an analysis of the individual components corruption).  
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capture the optimistic side of Afghans: all of the independent variables, except for two 
related to ethnicity, show increasing likelihood of positive evaluations regarding the 
direction of the government. One exception is that individuals self-identifying by 
ethnicity are less likely (17.6% decrease in odds in Model 1) to think the country is going 
in the right direction compared to those identifying as Afghans. The second exception 
concerns the Hazaras. We can see that all ethnic groups except for Hazaras show an 
increased likelihood of thinking the government is going in the right directions. This is 
not surprising since Hazaras are the smallest of the major ethnic groups and have 
historically been marginalized in Afghanistan (Barfield 2010).  
Looking at the effects of the independent variables on evaluations of government 
performance (Models 3-4), the most dramatic difference is the effect of ethnicity. While 
all ethnic groups are generally optimistic about the direction of the country, they are 
considerable less likely than Pashtuns to think that government performance is adequate. 
In Model 3, the odds of positively evaluating government performance are 28.3% lower 
for the largest minority (Tajiks) and 48.4% lower for Hazaras. One possible explanation 
for this difference may be the effect of the presidential election, scheduled for August 
2009, these groups were looking ahead. All but the Harazas would have a chance to 
improve their political fortunes, and it was unclear at this point if the incumbent President 
Hamid Karzai would be running again.  
Across all four models, the two specific support items, life improvement and 
security are in the expected direction. As predicted by Kalyvas, and consistent with 
counterinsurgency doctrine, security appears to have the biggest impact on support and 
overwhelmingly on perceptions of the direction of the country.  
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Table 3.2. Opinion of Government Direction and Performance 
 
 Direction  Performance 
  Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4 
  Logit Ologit   Logit Ologit 
Age 0.999 -.0001  1.001 0.001 
  (0.00167) (0.001)  (0.00146) (0.001) 
        
Gender 0.868** -.0044836  1.009 -0.047 
  (0.04) (0.039)  (0.0408) (0.034) 
        
Education 1.023 .0140  1.093*** 0.074*** 
  (0.02) (0.017)  (0.0186) (0.015) 
        
Self Identification (Reference: As Afghan) 
   By ethnicity 0.825** -.192***  0.958 -0.015 
  (0.0531) (0.055)  (0.0553) (0.049) 
        
   By tribe 1.078 -.012  0.675*** -0.415*** 
  (0.12) (0.094)  (0.0737) (0.087) 
        
   Other 0.824 -.265*  1.105 0.122 
  (0.128) (0.128)  (0.146) (0.112) 
        
   As Muslim 0.873 -.088  0.842 -0.230 
  (0.0955) (0.094)  (0.0843) 0.083** 
        
Life Improvement 1.190*** .160***  1.120*** 0.169*** 
  (0.0341) (0.024)  (0.0286) (0.022) 
        
Security Improved 2.039*** .720***  1.551*** 0.465*** 
  (0.0688) (0.029)  (0.0465) (0.026) 
        
Geographic Area 0.791*** -.130*  0.907 0.002 
  (0.0512) (0.055)  (0.0511) (0.048) 
        
Ethnicity (Reference: Pashtun) 
   Tajik 1.153** .080  0.717*** -0.146*** 
  (0.0615) (0.045)  (0.0335) (0.040) 
        
   Uzbek 1.568*** .381***  0.912 0.103 
  (0.145) (0.073)  (0.0649) (0.061) 
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   Hazara 0.834* -.263**  0.516*** -0.444*** 
  (0.0768) (0.077)  (0.0438) (0.069) 
        
   Other 1.442*** .134*  0.751*** 0.014 
  (0.124) (0.068)  (0.0537) (0.059) 
        
Trustworthy Messaging 1.362*** .308***  1.308*** 0.271*** 
  (0.0349) (0.022)  (0.031) (0.020) 
        
Respect Religion 1.333*** .301***  1.265*** 0.251*** 
  (0.0348) (0.023)  (0.0322) (0.021) 
        
Corruption Problem 1.147*** .110***  1.062** 0.068*** 
  (0.0304) (0.021)  (0.0238) (0.019) 
            
Observations 12020 12020   12470 12470 
Standard errors in parentheses. Logit coefficients presented as odds ratios.   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Turning to other diffuse support items, greater trust in the government increases 
support as expected, as does perceptions that the government respects the religion and 
traditions of Afghanistan. Given that a solid majority of Afghans consider government 
messages trustworthy and the government to be respectful of religion of tradition, it 
appears that the government enjoys support according to the criteria laid out by 
Stinchombe.  The extent to which people believe corruption is not a serious problem 
reflects positively on regime support.  However, given that a vast majority don’t is 
problematic for support—yet, it provides evidence that remedying the corruption 
perception problem would be beneficial for increased regime support. Further, the effect 
of geographic area, discussed in some histories of Afghanistan, appears to not hold. Rural 
areas show more support for the government over more populated areas. This may not be 
all good news since less populated, more rural areas, are also less likely to have contact 
with its corruption. 
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 A more complete analysis of this case would include an examination of support 
specifically for the Taliban. However due to the sensitivity of the topic and the safety of 
the interviewer the same questions were not asked about the Taliban. Lyall et al. (2013) 
argue that asking potentially sensitive questions about an armed belligerent requires 
survey experiments designed to avoid individuals from having to reveal their preferences. 
The survey does include an appropriate proxy which asks about the trustworthiness of 
Taliban messaging (See Fig 3.3). While far from perfect comparison, it can nonetheless 
help shed light on the loss of support experienced by the Afghan government and the 
gains made by the Taliban. The logistic regression results are presented in Table 3.3. For 
ease of comparison, the results of Model 3 in Table 3.2 are reproduced here. Importantly, 
the regression results reveal that corruption perceptions do result in a gain of trust in 
Taliban messaging. This solidifies concerns that both the government and its external 
partner (ISAF) should pay closer attention to corruption’s ability to hinder the war effort.  
It is also concerning that the geographic area variable shows the odds of trusting 
Taliban messaging are 20.05% larger in populated areas over rural areas. If this variable 
does capture, at least in part, government penetration and contact then the government 
could be alienating citizens by sheer ineptitude. Additional, analysis is needed to confirm 
whether this is indeed an accurate interpretation. However, these two negative trends are 
counterbalanced by the governments ability to improve life conditions and provide 
security. Further, the Taliban (a predominately Pashtun movement) has little chance to 





Table 3.3. Trust in Taliban vs. Government Performance 
	
  
Trust in Taliban 
Model 4   
Performance 
Model 3 
Independent Variables Odds Ratio S.E.  Odds Ratio S.E. 
Age 1.000 -0.002   1.001 0.6 
Gender  0.929 -0.039  1.009 -0.041 
Education 1.029 -0.018  1.093*** -0.019 
         
Self Identification (Reference: As Afghan) 
By ethnicity 1.578*** -0.09  0.958 -0.055 
By tribe 1.723*** -0.168  0.675*** -0.074 
Other 1.09 -0.151  1.105 -0.146 
As Muslim 0.875 -0.089  0.842 -0.084 
         
Life Improvement 0.971 -0.025  1.12*** -0.029 
Security Improved  0.795*** -0.024  1.551*** -0.046 
Geographic Area 1.281*** -0.075  0.907 -0.051 
         
Ethnicity (Reference: Pashtun)  
Tajik 0.677*** -0.033  0.717*** -0.034 
Uzbek 0.508*** -0.042  0.912 -0.065 
Hazara 0.631*** -0.055  0.516*** -0.044 
Other 0.641*** -0.049  0.751*** -0.054 
         


























Respect Religion (Gov.) 0.783*** -0.019  1.265*** -0.032 
Corruption Problem 1.092*** -0.025   1.062** -0.024 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
Conclusion 
The battle over the final center of power, the population, in Afghanistan is shaped 
by a number of factors that also inform support in countries without active conflict 
characterized by irregular warfare. Citizens value security and want their lives to 
improve. The issue of security is clearly salient in conflict environments, but it does not 
make people ignore other areas of their life or serious issues facing the country. 
Corruption detracts from governmental support in conflict, and appears to result in 
increased trust in the insurgents attempting to oust it. The relative magnitude of the shift 
in support suggests that the incumbent government could overcome the loss through 
security and improvement of the population’s living standards and combating corruption. 
However, an insurgent is able to do more with small amounts of support to maintain its 
ability to hide among the population. The incumbent government, on the other hand, must 




Chapter 4: Corruption and Support for Combatants in Irregular Warfare 
 
 
The support of the local population is seen as a critical component of victory in irregular 
warfare.43 An oft-cited dictum from Trinquier (1964) is “civilian” or “popular” support is 
“the sine qua non of victory.”44 This is because the insurgent forces often depend on local 
populations for food, shelter, and information. Even if material support is being provided 
to insurgents by external actors, information, acquiescence, and, at the very minimum, 
neutrality of the local population is desired by the counterinsurgents. The incumbent 
government and allies desire the same, thus a game is set to compete over required areas 
of support. 
A number of possible explanations for support for combatants have been offered 
in the conflict literature, including ideological and religious similarity (Davis et al. 2012), 
intergroup biases, and specifically co-ethnicity, (Lyall et al. 2013) and strategic 
calculations balancing benefits, costs and prospects of victory or future rewards (see e.g., 
Kalyvas 2006). Many of these explanations, however, suffer from inferential error due to 
individual preference falsification in the historical record or hindsight bias by certain 
scholars (Kalyvas 2006). Generally, this means the victor is presumed to have ‘won’ the 
support of the population.  
																																								 																					
43 This term is used by Kalyvas (2006) in his book on civil war to demarcate population centric warfare 
from conventional warfare fought between two armies. In the latter case, the battles are not fought among 
and through the local population, but focus on one another. As this book makes clear and is discussed in 
Goldstone 2010, the type of violent political conflict can often be discussed interchangeably. For example, 
insurgency can be one stage of civil war, which if it leads to the change of political institutions can then be 
classified as revolutionary. I mention this here to make it clear that I am borrowing from several branches 
of the political instability/violence literature, which is united by the need to gain a measure of local support. 
This is consistent with previous work on this topic (c.f. Lyall et al. 2013), and Kalyvas (2008) points out 
that the Army counterinsurgency manual itself would not change if one substituted civil war for insurgency 
throughout the document. 
44 Cited in Kalyvas (2006, Kindle Location 2642, sec. 4.3), but continues to be acknowledged in the 
literature (see also Lyall et al 2013). However, following some of the concerns expressed by Kalyvas, an 
entire edited volume was recently dedicated to a critical review of counterinsurgency conventional wisdom 
topics such as this (Gventer et al. 2014).	
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Moreover, the literature has overlooked a key factor mediating citizens’ support 
for warring factions: corruption. There has been a trend to ignore the effects of corruption 
in conflict studies, at a penalty to explanatory power (Shelley 2014). For example, recent 
journalistic and personal accounts of the civil war in Syria suggest corrupt behavior of 
insurgents could be driving support of ISIS.45 Chayes (2015) tells the story of a former 
Afghan policeman acting as her NGO manager, who was so angry with the treatment of 
his brother by corrupt police in Kandahar, saying: “My sacred oath, if I see someone 
planting an IED on a road, and then I see a police truck coming, I will turn away. I will 
not warn them” (Chp. 1). Chayes also points out later in the book that Machiavelli 
warned, above all, that theft of a subject’s goods makes them hated, and widespread 
hatred breeds conspiracy, and conspiracy “reliably brought down governments” (Chp. 2).  
Therefore, any analysis that fails to account for corrupt behavior’s impact on 
government support is missing a key explanatory variable. Whether corruption takes the 
form of demanding bribes for service, violating property rights, or dishonest use of 
religious authority, one must recognize the likelihood that government corruption reduces 
its favorability to its citizens, and in some cases drives people to provide active support to 
the opposition.  Given evidence of this trend in Chapter 3, this should be of equal 
concerns to an international counterinsurgent force attempting to support a country.  That 
IED, not reported, could just as easily blow up its forces if not reported by a sympathetic 
local. 
In this chapter, I examine the factors that influence citizens’ support for 
combatants in Afghanistan. In particular, I build on the work of Lyall et al (2013, 2014) 
																																								 																					
45 See especially, “Do Syrians support US airstrikes in Syria?” 19 September 14, Al-Monitor, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/syria-isis-srf-iran-russia-unga.html# last accessed on 9 
Dec 15. 
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by examining the impact of corruption, which is consistently cited as one of the most 
important problems facing Afghanistan.46 In their 2013 study, using a survey experiment 
administered in five provinces, the authors find that support for combatants, specifically 
ISAF and the Taliban, is conditioned by ethnic similarity (intergroup bias). The authors, 
however, did not account for corruption and how corrupt actions by Afghan government 
officials may impact support of the population for ISAF, who was doing the bulk of the 
fighting from 2001 to 2014. 
Survey research can provide an opportunity to move beyond anecdotal evidence 
to capture attitudinal expressions of support for opposing and allied actors in irregular 
warfare. U.S. government funded surveys in Afghanistan conducted in December 2008 
and March 2009 will allow me to answer this question. These survey waves expand the 
regions surveyed beyond the smaller sample conducted by Lyall’s research team and a 
similar small-scale effort by Beath et al (2011). Additionally, the survey asks a unique set 
of questions regarding corruption that allow us to observe whether it is just perceived 
corruption or corruption perpetrated by government forces which impacts ISAF support. 
The analysis shows that corruption by the Afghan government does lower support 
for ISAF. It also extends and refines previous work (e.g. Kalyvas 2006, 2008, Kilcullen 
2010, Mishler and Rose 1997) by examining the role of trust and cultural respect, both of 
which strongly affect individual support for the counterinsurgents I find, contrary to Lyall 
et al. (2013), that support for ISAF is similar across ethnic groups, when controlling for 
trust and respect of culture. 
																																								 																					
46 “Corruption,” notes General John R. Allen, USMC, “is the existential, strategic threat to Afghanistan” 
(cited in Holdren et al. 2014, p. 143) 
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Literature Overview 
         Observers of irregular war have posited many explanations for the support of local 
inhabitants for the combatants, and these conflicting explanations have likely made recent 
quantitative studies on political violence more attractive (c.f. Collier and Hoeffler 2005, 
Boix 2003, 2008). However, these large-N cross-national studies are not without 
problems. For example, economic research examining proxies for “greed” (available rent-
seeking opportunities) and “grievance” (economic inequality) in the civil war literature 
have not yielded tractable causal explanations for why or when these concepts matter 
(Kalyvas 2008, Taydas et al 2011, Haggard and Kaufman 2012).47 
Previous literature on civil war has found that ethnicity is an important variable in 
predicting the probability for civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Further, ethnic 
fault lines also serve to predict the likely conflict zones within a state (Weidmann 2009). 
Ethnicity has also been posited to matter less than rational self-interest, which can lead to 
ethnic defection wherein citizens abandon co-ethnics and support a non-native power 
(Kalyvas 2006, 2008). More recently, Lyall (2010) uses a case study on the Chechen 
conflict to argue that there is a “coethnicity advantage,” which refines the expected 
direction of support and adds nuance to Kalyvas’ ethnic defection thesis.  Essentially, if 
an ethnic force does defect it appears to be more effective in patrolling is own ethnicity.  
Seeking to deepen our understanding for ethnic based support during conflict, 
Lyall et al (2013) conducted a survey experiment in five provinces of Afghanistan in 
order to gauge the relative support for the Taliban and ISAF. They found that in-group 
																																								 																					
47 Kalyvas suggests this is partially due to a misunderstanding of the collective action problem during 
conflict—where there are many assumptions that ‘greed’ — material incentives — is required to obtain 
active support. However, the ‘do nothing’ expectation in response to the free riding assumption of the 
collective action problem may not be a viable choice if either side is threatening violence to individuals 
who do not actively support a side. 
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similarity leads to greater support (or more tolerance of grievances) among local Afghans 
in five Pashtun dominated provinces. Their results were framed as surprising since 
evidence suggests that the Taliban was the cause of more damage to local populations, 
which would likely decrease support among those locals. The Taliban, however, avoids 
blame at a rate that suggests a “coethnic” bias, whereas ISAF causes around 75% fewer 
casualties and damage, but receives more blame. 
 While it is clear that they attempt to control for the level of violence, they do not 
offer any commentary or analysis on the role corruption in shaping support, despite 
acknowledging that it was one of the top issues in the country at the time. Given that 
corruption was second only to security it is likely to have some effect on support for the 
Afghan government and ISAF.  
In addition to corruption, absent from the analysis are individuals’ assessments of 
the performance of district and provincial level government officials. These officials are 
the front line of the political struggle in the counterinsurgency. As a result, we should 
expect that if their actions lose support from the local population that this loss will extend 
to national level forces working in the area. This is especially true in Afghanistan since 
President Karzai appoints district and provincial-level officials, and thus, their behavior 
reflects on the overall opinion of the Afghan government. The absence of this 
commentary is surprising as the main thrust of Lyall (2010) was to suggest that coethnic 
counterinsurgents are helpful to the war effort. In Lyall et al (2013), the coethnic benefit 
goes to the insurgents. Why doesn’t the presence of Afghan political and military actors 
neutralize the ethnic bias?  I argue that there must be another variable, apart from 
ethnicity, which is mediating support for the coethnics. 
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Corruption and Support for ISAF 
Corruption has regularly been identified as an important consideration in public 
opinion polling (Asia Foundation 2010). The ANQAR survey confirms that corruption is 
viewed as a serious problem. As we can see from Figure 1, 60.99% strongly agree and 
26.28% somewhat agree that “corruption is a serious problem in the government.”  Only 
7.26% disagree somewhat and 5.48% disagree strongly with this statement.  
 
Given that corruption is regularly reported by Afghanis to be one of the most 
pressing problem facing the country, it is reasonable to expect corruption also plays an 
important role in citizens’ support for warring factions, an expectation consistent with 
anecdotal and journalistic reports of the link between corruption and support from Syria 
to Yemen to Afghanistan. The inclusion of corruption as a determinant of support for 
combatant groups is also consistent with more recent findings in the civil war literature. 



















statistical evidence that better quality institutions (measured using indexes rating degree 
of corruption in government, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality) reduce the likelihood 
of civil war onset. This suggests that satisfaction, or support of institutions, prevents 
conflict onset, and may be an important variable mediating support for opposing sides 
once conflict begins. Corruption, rule of law, and local government capacity nested 
within local perceptions should provide a robust test for this logic. Lyall et al. (2013) 
work on Afghanistan appears to need additional explanatory variables to account for 
support going to the coethnic Taliban, when it could have just as easily gone to the 
coethnic Afghan government, I hypothesize that perceived and experienced types of 
corruption are affecting levels of support for counterinsurgents and insurgents. 
Previous work on corruption notes that not all types of corruption are perceived to 
be problematic by local citizens. For example, a case study on perceptions of corruption 
in Estonia suggests that “both public officials and citizens are more likely to engage in 
corruption when they do not define corruption as wrong, and when they perceive that 
corrupt behavior is widespread among their peers” (Tavits, 2010, p. 1257). However, this 
finding did not hold among persons who had been extorted (Ibid, 1274). This suggests 
two things. 
First, different types of corrupt behavior can be perceived as more or less bad, and 
we should therefore not expect all types of corruption to have the same effect on levels of 
support. Previous studies have examined this topic to suggest that types of corruption can 
be seen as a continuum from definitely corrupt (black) to not corrupt (white). The middle 
area or grey are consists of those things that might be technically corrupt in a legal sense, 
but is not seen as ‘bad’ by most people (Peters and Welch 1989). This research also 
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points to heterogeneity across groups in that different sub-populations may not perceive 
the same acts to be corrupt to the same degree.  
Second, we should also expect perceptions to be conditional on whether or not an 
individual has been extorted. When an individual has been extorted, we should expect he 
or she to see this behavior as highly problematic, regardless of the extant social norms 
regarding the various potential types of corruption. Such action goes beyond the grey area 
of impartiality or social acceptability of certain behaviors and represents a concrete loss 
to individuals who have been extorted. In other words, negative experiences with 
corruption should negatively impact perceptions of corruption.  
The theoretical expectation is, therefore, that individuals will perceive certain acts 
of corruption as worse than others, depending on the context (i.e. the social acceptability 
of certain acts) and on one’s experience with corruption. These perceptions, will in turn, 
impact both support for individual members of the incumbent government officials and 
an any affiliated external counterinsurgent force. In the Chayes (2015) example, paying 
small bribes was expected. However, when the individual was asked to pay a very large 
bribe by the police, and was then harassed (slapped) for his unwillingness to pay, the 
individual’s brother expressed his unwillingness to support government forces if the 
Taliban placed an IED near them. The negative experience with corrupt behavior (beyond 
what was viewed as socially acceptable, i.e., paying a small bribe) clearly impacted the 
brother’s support for government forces. Such experiences are also likely to affect the 
levels of support for the incumbent government and by extension the counterinsurgent 
forces (e.g., ISAF) supporting the government.  
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Discussing support in this manner is consistent with the literature’s conceptual 
treatment of support as having specific and diffuse components (Easton 1965, 1975; 
Norris 2011; Booth and Seligson 2009).48  There is the specific support (or lack there of) 
of local actors allied with the incumbent government and counterinsurgent forces. Then 
there is the general (diffuse) support for the larger entities and institutions involved. 
Negative interaction with local officials or institutions can undermine specific support, as 
well as diffuse support. This is consistent with research that finds that people formulate 
their views about the fairness of institutions and systems from their interactions with 
authorities. For example, Peffley and Hurwitz (2010) show how different racial treatment 
in the American justice system undermines support for the system when system officials 
treat individuals unfairly. In a review of the literature, Peffley and Rohrscheider (2014) 
point out that, “for most citizens, encounters with the police, bureaucrats, and legal 
authorities are as close as they come to an experience with the government” (p. 183). 
Therefore, we should expect that interactions, whether positive or negative, with local 
affiliates to inform individuals’ support for both the Afghan government and an enabling 
political actor like ISAF.  
In this paper, I expect that experiences support at both the specific and diffuse 
levels.  However, such negative interactions can also extend to actors associated with the 
government and its officials. In this case, individual experience, whether negative or 
positive, will shape his or her opinions of and support for the government. However, the 
effect can extend beyond the government. For example, positive or negative perceptions 
of local and national Afghan actors and institutions, will likely also shape individuals’ 
attitudes of ISAF for those individuals who see ISAF as the supporting power, facilitating 
																																								 																					
48 See Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion on this literature. 
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the government of Afghanistan’s actions.49  Afghans have historically demonstrated such 
sophistication. For example, in September 1879, three regiments of unpaid Afghan 
soldiers bypassed the local Afghan government to petition British officials who were seen 
to have influence over the Afghan rulers (Barfield 2010, p. 141).50  Thus, it reasonable to 
expect that locals might not judge ISAF only on it own behavior. Rather, support for 
ISAF is likely to be linked to the behavior and outputs of the incumbent government and 
its agents. The concern for the international counterinsurgency efforts is that because 
corruption is so bad in Afghanistan, and perceived to be a major problem by a majority of 
the population, the public will support neither the government nor the supporting 
international forces working to defeat anti-government forces, such as the Taliban. 
 Scholarship on support for incumbents and insurgents in irregular warfare has not 
followed the same contours as support for democratic regimes. There is a different set of 
factors that are expected to shape support for combatants during conflict. Kalyvas (2006) 
provides an extensive review of the literature and suggests that we start by thinking about 
support in two ways. The first is citizens’ attitudes and preference; the second, the 
behavior or actions of citizens towards combatants (p. #). He raises concerns about 
previous interpretations of attitudinal support derived only by inferring popular support 
must have been on the side of the victor. Further, he cites over 25 different reasons for 
individuals to support either side in a conflict, including protection against violence, 
moral outrage, and the desire to take revenge (see Chp 4, sec 3). 
																																								 																					
49 Of course this is not the only way attitudes are formed about ISAF. The population could have direct 
contact or receive information about the patrolling or political behavior of ISAF departments and units. 
Studies normally look at causality rates or some other proxy to capture military unit and population (Lyall 
et al 2013). The point here is to highlight this secondary but major actor, the local government, which often 
fades into the background as the U.S. media, policy makers, and academic researchers focus on the U.S. 
versus the belligerent. 
50 It is a complicated manner as ‘historically’ the Afghan rulers used this middle position to attempt to 
manipulate both external powers, including both Russia and Britain, and local perceptions.	
	 69	
How are we to move forward?  First and foremost, Kalyvas did not consider that 
survey work would be done in conflict zones in the future. Current survey working being 
conducted in ongoing conflict zones, including both Afghanistan and Iraq, offers a way to 
assess the local population’s attitudes of and support for the actors fighting the war, as 
opposed to attempting to assess support for various combatant groups after the conclusion 
of the conflict. Using surveys frees us from relying on the assumption that an area 
controlled by the government or Taliban is necessarily attributed to support for the 
controlling faction 
 We can now bring our understanding of specific and diffuse support back into the 
discussion to specify expectations and limitations of our approach. Both of the concepts 
of diffuse and specific support are attitudinal. We cannot know whether the attitudinal 
support resulting from either the performance outputs of specific support, or to a more 
diffuse form of support due to socialization processes will result in behavioral support 
(e.g., offering assistance to a group). The decision to act raises a new set of theoretical 
questions such as those associated with the collective action problem during conflict 
(Olson 1965; Lichbach 1998). Even though Kalyvas (2008) shows how the role of 
coercion shifts the ‘stay at home’ expectation: people will not stay at home if threatened, 
it is less clear whether this translates into observed behavioral support. It is still difficult 
to get individuals to actively assist either side during conflict due to the difficulty in 
credibly enforcing threats. Moreover, coercion, according to Kalyvas, tends to trump 
ideological preferences, including religious and cultural, which can also influence 
support.51  
																																								 																					
51 Kalyvas (2006) is silent on religion and culture being the basis of social contracts that facilitates 
collective action (Lichbach 1998).  
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Gventer et al (2014) suggest that counterinsurgent scholars preoccupied with 
rational self-interest avoid serious treatment of the role of ideological and value-driven 
preferences that can motivate behavior and attitudinal support. Hewstone el al (2002) cite 
strong religious beliefs as one of the predictors of prejudice that can, in turn, influence 
support. Lyall et al (2013) also argue for the importance of identity-based preferences, 
but consider only ethnicity and not the importance of religion and culture values.52  A 
properly specified model, therefore, would also include an ideological dimension, in 
addition to ethnicity, as a predictor of diffuse support. 
In addition to ethnicity and ideological preferences, another important factor to 
consider is trust. Kalyvas (2006, 2008) agrees with the collective action literature that 
trust is an important variable that holds coalitions together in conflict. Kilcullen (2010) 
argues that building “trusted networks” is critical to increase influence and popular 
support to rival enemy networks (p. 36). If the local population does not trust the 
counterinsurgent force it will be difficult to build a movement to support efforts against 
the rival faction. If trust serves as the glue to maintain support in a coalition, then upon 
what basis is foreign counterinsurgent able to build trust? When the popular support 
literature evaluates trust with respect to diffuse support for institutions, it reasons that 
people have built trust through multiple interactions with the state apparatus (Norris 
2011).53 Mishler and Rose (1997), citing Gamson (1968), highlight that trust allows 
authorities to make decisions and commit resources without relying on coercion, which, 
in turn, should engender greater public support if the authority is successful in its 
																																								 																					
52 Ironically, Lyall et al rely on Hewstone et al (2002) as their theoretical foundation to posit that “in-
groups” will evaluate their own members more favorably that the “out-group.” Nevertheless, they fail to 
consider other dimensions of identity.  
53 …or at least through an early life socialization process (Mishler and Rose 1997). Presumably this 
socialization makes them familiar with the region’s political competition so that when confronted with a 
new system (in this study new democracies in Europe) they can still have trust in it.	
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decision-making. Since trust is essential to building public support it is likely that a 
foreign counterinsurgent will be challenged by trust issues that might cause popular 
support to stagnate or diminish. 
Despite our inability to determine whether attitudinal support will yield 
behavioral support in conflict, it is not unreasonable to assume that if one side lacks 
attitudinal support they will be less likely to receive behavioral support. Kalyvas suggests 
that behavioral support will ultimately result from a mix of persuasion and coercion. 
Therefore, the attitudinal support captured in the survey will have the most use in 
exploring factors that would suggest persuasive appeal. Furthermore, since global norms 
pressure international counterinsurgents to use only persuasion (Gventer et al 2014), we 
must, therefore, invest in understanding the elements of persuasive support given the 
constraints imposed by global norms against the use of coercion to ensure population 
compliance.  In the next section, this paper evaluates the dimensions of support for ISAF. 
The analysis, as discussed in the concluding chapter, offers several important 
implications for whether ISAF is capable of inducing the local population to help defeat 
insurgent forces. 
Data and Methods 
Although there are several years of surveys available, the battery of corruption questions 
were asked only in two consecutive waves: December 2008 and March 2009. The survey 
includes 16,791 respondents in all of Afghanistans 34 provinces. Information on the 




The dependent variable captures the level of support for ISAF. The question asked 
respondents,  “On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being Very High and 5 being Very Low, how would 
you rate your opinion of ISAF in Afghanistan?”  This question captures a dimension of 
diffuse support, which allows us to use independent variables that are components of this 
level of support such as nationalism and religious identity, but we can also examine items 
of specific support (i.e. security provided, and operations conducted), which should affect 
the diffuse level of support (Easton 1975). Figure 2 presents the proportion of 
respondents in each category. In order to aid in interpretation, I recoded the variable into 
a binary variable to capture whether a respondent views ISAF favorably (coded as 1), 
with the midpoint having a slightly positive designation (3 = “fair”) being included on the 























Corruption is the main independent variable being analyzed in this study. I 
include two sets of variables to capture corruption. One of the unique aspects of the 
ANQAR survey is that there are several possible measures of corruption, including both 
perceptional and experienced or observed corruption questions. It allows me to 
distinguish between types of corruption that may not be particularly relevant to 
determining support. For example, the survey asks about bribe paying and whether 
certain political officials are seen as corrupt. It is likely that paying baksheesh (a bribe) is 
not a strong source of grievance, and thus have little impact on support, but more serious 
forms of corruption, such as theft, would strongly reduce support.55 The first set of 
variables, therefore, consists of experienced or observed corruption by members of the 
police and national army. The results from Chapter 2 highlighted that perceptions of 
government institutions and actors’ performance were the most relevant factors in 
determining perceptions of corruption as a serious problem. However, the final model 
examining government performance examination showed that the experience of misdeeds 
were still problematic but already high levels of corruption attenuated the contribution of 
misdeeds to poor evaluations of the government significantly. 
An important point of investigation is to determine whether the corruption where 
ISAF would have a more direct ability to influence will have a greater impact on popular 
support for ISAF. This should mean that corruption carried out by the national army and 
police are more likely to be relevant to support for ISAF than corruption in the court 
system since ISAF is seen as having more direct influence on the army and police, rather 
than the court system. It is unclear the extent to which people will connect perceptions of 
																																								 																					
55 See Chapter 1 for a more extensive discussion on this issue.  
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Afghan institutions, such as district, provincial and national government institutions, and 
local leaders to ISAF. On the one hand, since ISAF is seen as a supporting the 
government, one could expect that perceptions of corruption in government institutions 
would be detrimental to ISAF support. On the other hand, however, President Karzai 
often reinforced the independence of the Afghan government, especially when related to 
negative outcomes from ISAF activities (Chaudhuri and Farrell 2011). Yet, ISAF 
regional commands were seen to accept corruption as a cultural reality (Ibid), and this 
laissez faire attitude may reinforce ISAF culpability. Looking at perceived court 
corruption and the perceived misuse of power by district and provincial governors will 
help clarify this relationship.  
Additional Elements of Support 
 While I am emphasizing corruption, the provision of security is expected to be a 
baseline requirement to establish support in the counterinsurgency literature. As in 
Chapter 2, I use the question, “Is the security in your mantaqa [community or locale] 
better, the same or worse than it was 6 months ago?”  Approximately 30% of respondents 
replied that it improved, while 52.46% responded it stayed the same and 16.94% replied 
it had worsened. Lyall et al (2013) also asked respondents whether they were affected by 
either ISAF or Taliban violence and found exposure to violence reduced individual 
support for the offending party. The instrument in the ANQAR survey does allow us to 
determine if the individual has been directly affected by operation bombings, as Lyall et 
al. Nevertheless, it does offer two similar questions. The first question provides a 
measure of the security situation, which has been highlighted in the previous literature as 
an important determinant of support. The second question asks respondents whether they 
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have been affected by operations and bombings. I expect improvement in the security 
situation to positively impact support, but being effected by operations and bombings will 
reduce support.  
Beyond security and corruption, I include two variables that capture the direct 
perception of ISAF on two important areas related to diffuse support. The first is the 
perceived respect of religion and traditions of Afghanistan. If ISAF is perceived to not 
respect these traditions, then it should reflect poorly on their overall support. The 
question asks whether ISAF respects the religion and traditions of Afghans. As can be 
seen in Figure 3, a majority of respondents believed ISAF was not very or not at all 
respectful.  
 
The second variable captures citizens’ trust in ISAF. As discussed above, the level 
of trust between the counterinsurgent and the population is important. Respondents were 
asked whether ISAF messaging was “Totally Trustworthy,” “Somewhat Trustworthy,” 
“Somewhat Untrustworthy,” or “Very Untrustworthy” Figure 4 shows that a majority of 


























uses a proxy of how trustworthy their messaging is perceived to be, which is especially 
appropriate given that persuasion is one of the few tools remaining when coercion is 
taken off the table. 
 
Demographic Controls 
We have seen in Chapter 2 that the support for the Afghan government was 
connected to several demographic characteristics (age, gender, education), a finding 
consistent with previous literature. These demographic variables are also expected to 
influence support for combatants (see e.g., Lyall et al. 2013). Lyall et al. (2013) also use 
income and the number of years of madrassa education in their study, citing previous 
conflict and terrorism literature. Again, there is no direct measure for income, but the use 
of the life improvement variable will capture the socio-economic performance 
expectations.  However, both of these variables, as well as education, are disputed as 
being relevant in the literature (c.f. Shapiro and Fair 2010, Bullock et al 2011, Blair et al 
2013 for relevant Pakistan cases disputing their relevance). Instead, regional issues and 

























In addition, I include respondents’ ethnic group.  Minority ethnic groups are more 
likely to be supportive, since international intervention as forced more power-sharing 
with the historically dominant Pashtuns.  A district (similar to county) variable controls 
for differences in interaction with ISAF.  In some districts, there is less ISAF presence as 
it moved to try to focus on what it considered key districts.  There was also variation in 
the type of ISAF units from district to district.  For example, some units focused entirely 
on reconstruction and government support. 
Findings 
 Table 4.1 presents the results of the first logistic regression.56 Coefficients are 
presented as odds ratios for ease of interpretation. The results of the model reveal that 
effect of the demographic controls are consistent with the literature. Increased levels of 
education and improved life condition positively affect support. Males are less likely than 
females to hold favorable attitudes towards ISAF. Lyall et al., who did not attempt to 
seek out female participants does not register that there is increased levels of support in 
this portion of the population. Women are 30% more likely than men to support ISAF. 
ISAF’s primary charter is to provide security and those areas where citizens reported the 
level of security remaining the same or improving improvement showed a 90+% increase 
in support for ISAF compared to areas where the security situation was reported to have 
gotten worse. Since there was strong support for areas that that remained the same it is 
likely that ‘sameness’ was a state of security. However, having been affected by 
operations and bombing against the Taliban does decrease support for ISAF, which is 
consistent with the findings from the Lyall research. 
																																								 																					
56 See Table 4.2 in the appendix for a robustness check on the dependent variable. 
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Table 4.1: Opinion of ISAF 
    Model 1   Model 2 
Independent Variables   Odds Ratio Std. Err.   Odds Ratio Std. Err. 
Age  0.999 (0.00197)  0.999 (0.00197) 
Gender  0.706*** (0.0393)  0.694*** (0.0389) 
Education  1.118*** (0.0256)  1.115*** (0.0257) 
Madrassa Education  0.976 (0.0132)  0.976 (0.0133) 
Life Improvement  1.111** (0.0374)  1.113** (0.0376) 
Security (Reference: Worse) 
     The Same  1.974*** (0.141)  1.939*** (0.14) 
     Better  1.926*** (0.153)  1.900*** (0.152) 
Affected by Bombing  0.890* (0.0459)  0.906 (0.047) 
District  1 (0.000217)  1 (0.00022) 
Ethnicity (Reference: Pashtun) 
     Tajik  1.356*** (0.0856)  1.417*** (0.0893) 
     Uzbek  1.400** (0.146)  1.439*** (0.151) 
     Hazara  1.442** (0.184)  1.475** (0.189) 
     Other  1.343** (0.127)  1.400*** (0.133) 
ISAF Message Trustworthy  0.543*** (0.0154)  0.544*** (0.0155) 
ISAF Respect Religion  0.569*** (0.0159)  0.570*** (0.016) 
Police: None  0.730*** (0.0403)     
Police: Bribe Taking     0.862* (0.0575) 
Police: Theft     0.662*** (0.0631) 
Police: Wrongful Arrest     0.875 (0.0828) 
Police: Harassment     0.667*** (0.0538) 
Police: Illegal Checks and 
Fees     0.821 (0.111) 
Police: Reckless Driving     0.876 (0.0679) 
Police: Qawm Partiality     1.005 (0.144) 
Police: Smuggling     0.875 (0.133) 
Army: None  0.776*** (0.0465)     
Army: Bribe Taking     0.91 (0.0967) 
Army: Theft     0.901 (0.138) 
Army: Wrongful Arrest     0.82 (0.0874) 
Army: Harassment     0.760* (0.0904) 
Army: Illegal Checks and 
Fees     0.522
*** (0.0998) 
Army: Reckless Driving     0.948 (0.0788) 
Army: Qawm Partiality     0.894 (0.147) 
Army: Smuggling     0.628* (0.126) 
Court Corruption  0.837*** (0.0326)  0.841*** (0.0329) 
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Provincial Misuse of 
Power  0.894
** (0.0354)  0.895** (0.0356) 
District Misuse of Power  0.954 (0.0385)  0.949 (0.0384) 
Observations   9264     9264   
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses    
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
An important result of the model is the effect of ethnicity. The results of this 
analysis refute Lyall et al.’s claim that ethnic differences are driving Afghans to reject 
ISAF. All ethnic groups demonstrate positive trends in support of ISAF compared to 
Pashtuns. Pashtuns, however, only have slightly lower predicted probability of supporting 
ISAF (and still the average marginal effect is above 60%) than other ethnic groups. The 
baseline descriptive statistic shows Pashtuns almost evenly split in support of ISAF with 
53.2% expressing support and 46.8% withholding it.  
The reason is likely connected to levels of trust and religious ideology 
differences. First, if there is an intergroup bias effect, it is likely occurring as a result of 
individuals distancing themselves from foreign forces on this cultural dimension. 
However, the trustworthiness variable demonstrates a slightly larger impact on support. 
Given especially that their survey experiment uses a ‘ISAF says’ treatment, this particular 
measure of message trustworthiness could explain part of the negative sentiment toward 
ISAF. Since trust is an important component of building a successful counterinsurgency 
network, this is a troubling finding in predicting the future success of their fight against 
the Taliban. Furthermore, if persuasion is one of the major factors to build popular 
support, it is problematic that messaging that would be used to persuade is trustworthy. 
The inclusion of indicators of trust and cultural respect might account for the divergent 
findings regarding the effect of ethnicity between this work and the work of Lyall et al.  
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Perceived respect for religion/tradition and trustworthiness overshadow 
corruption in magnitude of likelihood of reducing support, but corruption still remains 
relevant. The perceptional variables of a corrupt court system and political leader misuse 
of power negatively weigh on ISAF support. Misuse of power at the district level is not 
statistically significant, which is not surprising since leaders at that level have relatively 
little power (and budget) to misuse compared to the provincial level (see Evans 2004 for 
a description of the Afghan system of government).  
The first model collapses the corruption experience/incidents variables for the 
police and national army into two variables: whether an individual observed any 
improper behavior by the police and national army. Observing corrupt behavior in both 
organizations decrease support for ISAF by 27% and 23% percent, respectively, 
compared to the baseline of no corrupt activities experienced. This result is consistent 
with my expectations that ISAF would be blamed more for areas over which it has more 
influence. However, it might be expected that since it more actively affiliates with the 
National Army in running its training program and conducting combined operations that 
corruption within the army would be more problematic than corruption carried out by the 
police. The difference is probably explained by the higher incident rate within the police 
force (see Chapter 1), and due to ISAF being more likely to patrol areas where only local 
police are present since they have a larger footprint than the National Army. 
Table 4.1, Model 2, examines the impact of specific experienced or observed 
improper or corrupt acts among the police and army on support for ISAF. In particular, in 
divides improper acts into eight dimensions for both the police and army: bribes, theft, 
wrongful arrest, harassment, illegal checkpoint fees, reckless driving, qawm impartiality, 
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and smuggling. Among the police, bribes are seen as problematic, but theft and 
harassment show the greatest impact on support with a respective 35% and 44% decrease 
in the odds of support compared to respondents who did not observe these improper acts. 
That harassment and theft is especially odious is consistent with Chayes’s (2015) account 
of her NGO manager’s brother. Individuals begrudge paying bribes, but when it turns to 
outright theft and humiliating harassment it is intolerable.  The other, more benign, forms 
of corruption do not show statistical significance in relation to ISAF support.  
Bribes and theft among members of the army are not statistically significant. This 
may be due to the very low incident rate for these categories. Illegal checkpoints and 
checkfees set up by the Army had the largest negative impact on support, among the all 
the corruption incidents variables, and indeed all independent variables, reducing the the 
odds of support by 49%. Wrongful arrest and harassment by the army also prove 
problematic for support for ISAF, potentially because ISAF may be seen as a patron or 
indirect accomplice of these activities. Interestingly, army smuggling activities reduces 
support by 40%. Previous discussions in Chapter 1 and above suggest that smuggling 
may be one of the ‘grey’ forms of corruption, not necessarily causing a loss to an 
individual and thus not expected to be considered a serious problem. It may be that 
smuggling is more concerning to the population when an Afghan government ally it 
permitted by ISAF to commit such an act of corruption. In this particular case, the 
smuggling activities may be conducted under banner of an ISAF support operation to 
cause individuals to establish a stronger connection between the smuggling and ISAF 
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responsibility.57  There is also a potential for loss of support due to hypocrisy if ISAF 
operations targeting local drug smuggling only affect civilians and not police or the army. 
Conclusion 
 This paper produces significant results for the conflict and counterinsurgency 
literature. Support for an international assistance force will be moderated by the 
performance of the government receiving assistance. Local corrupt practices are not 
considered only local problems once the force has arrived on the scene, and it would 
likely boost popular support for them to be seen as helping to solve problem corruption 
practices in addition to improving security.  
ISAF loses support for conducting operations in an area, yet gains support by 
establishing security. The Lyall et al. study is helpful in its analysis of activities that 
security forces like ISAF can do in order to counteract the negative consequences of 
operations, namely following-up to help patch up what they break. Otherwise, the 
intergroup bias found by Lyall et al is real, but it is not necessarily connected to ethnicity 
as opposed to a broader set of cultural factors. There are Pashtuns on both side of the war, 
and they hold the majority of political power in the country. It is not likely, therefore, that 
ethnic differences are the central factor driving support. Instead, cultural and religious 
differences, as found here, might also account for the out-grouping of ISAF found in their 
study. 
When combined with the overall lack of trust in ISAF messaging, ISAF is at a 
significant disadvantage when engaging with the local population and attempting to 
persuade them to join the fight against the Taliban. The cause is not hopeless. We see in 
																																								 																					
57 Otherwise, this variable has a very low occurrence rate, 255 incidents out of 4,058 (6.3%) of the total, 
and it may be an anomaly. 
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the concluding chapter that the population generally recognizes the roles of ISAF are 
useful and even wants them to help tackle the corruption problem. ISAF should, however, 
be sensitive to those incidents of corruption that people feel ISAF should be able to 
control—in this case, the loss inducing corrupt activity of its closest partners: the police 














Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Throughout this work we saw that multiple factors, in addition to corruption, effect 
support for the Afghan government, then ISAF. What does the above analysis imply 
about continued ISAF activities in Afghanistan? In particular, should ISAF have left the 
country? Here I attempt to answer a policy relevant question that would confront 
decision-makers given our understanding of support for ISAF. I run a final model to 
examine the factors that contribute to the citizens’ desires to have ISAF remain in the 
country. The dependent variable, asks “Should ISAF stay longer in Afghanistan?” 
Respondents are almost evenly split on the question with 49% saying that ISAF should 
stay longer and 51% saying they should “leave soon.” The theoretical premise would be 
consistent with Kalyvas (2006), who argued that citizens would put up with whatever 
power can bring security to their lives. However, it also considers that given the potential 
negative externalities from operations conducted to provide security that people might 
hold conflicting opinions—on the one hand they support increased security and the under 
they loathe the loss of life and property as security is established. 
It is expected that those actions by ISAF that directly impact the local population 
would affect their support for ISAF. Yet, the items in the previous analysis are not all 
directly connected.  Instead, most reflected consequences from Afghan government 
performance.  The regressions did include its primary function—bringing security to the 
country. However, there are several roles that ISAF plays. The obvious is to fight the 
Taliban in cooperation with the government of Afghanistan. However, there are two other 
roles that ISAF plays in the country. The first is to conduct reconstruction and 
development projects, and the second is to assist in improving the governing capacity of 
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the Afghan government. Both of these suggest the potential for external actors to bring 
resources and expertise to the country that would not be available otherwise.  
The analysis in Table 5.1 shows that being affected by operations and bombing 
does decrease the likelihood of support by 20.2%. However, on the question of whether 
people want ISAF to stay, to provide security dramatically increase the likelihood by 2.09 
times. It is not surprising that Afghans want ISAF to stay and conduct reconstruction 
projects, but it is interesting that the largest predictor is to assist the government. 
Significant to the entire dissertation is that existence of the corruption problem increases 
the likelihood that Afghans want ISAF to stay. This suggests that while ISAF is 
implicated and dragged down by the seriousness of corruption perceptions, it is at the 
same time seen to be an important counterweight to it. In this respect, the lack of support 
due to corruption may be due to the expectation that ISAF should do more to help 
mitigate the issue. 
The conflict for the final “center of power” continues in Afghanistan today.  The 
implication for future research in this field is to pay careful attention to the types of 
corruption that are seen locally as problematic rather than adopt a ‘standard’ or 
international conception of corruption and then attempt to analyze the effects of 
corruption using that standard.  While corruption is pervasive, it is not culturally 
acceptable.  Additionally, even greater geographical refinement would be useful to 
explore tradeoffs between the positive effects of security and the negative consequences 
of corruption.  Finally, a time-series analysis would be useful to determine if later anti-
corruption programs, first implemented in 2010, had any positive effects or if reported 
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interference with these efforts by the Karzai government (Chaudhuri and Farrell,  2011) 
has been detrimental to the resolving the conflict. 
Table 5.1: ISAF should stay longer 
    ISAF Should Stay Longer     
Independent Variables   Odds Ratio (S.E.)     
Age   0.996* (0.00178)     
Gender   0.821*** (0.0412)    
Education   0.985 (0.0204)    
Madrassa Education   0.997 (0.0125)    
District   1.001*** (0.0002)    
         
Ethnicity (Reference: Pashtun)  
Tajik   1.170** (0.0655)    
Uzbek   1.433*** (0.13)    
Hazara   1.208 (0.124)    
Other   0.974 (0.0811)    
Life Improvement   0.985 (0.031)    
Security Improved   1.091* (0.0393)    
Affected by Bombings   0.798*** (0.0377)    
ISAF Message Trustworthy   0.769*** (0.0201)    
ISAF Respect Religion   0.620*** (0.0156)    
ISAF Projects   1.932*** (0.128)    
ISAF Security   2.095*** (0.132)    
ISAF Government Security   2.369*** (0.127)    
Corruption is Serious Problem   1.102*** (0.0306)    
Observations   9802       
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses   
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Appendix – Chapter 3 
 
Table 3A.1 Opinion of Government Direction: Alternative Coding 
of Dependent Variable 
  Logit 1 Logit 2 Ologit 
       
Age 0.999 0.999 -.0001 
  (0.00152) (0.00167) (0.001) 
       
Gender 1.106* 0.868** -0.004 
  (0.0462) (0.04) (0.039) 
       
Education 1.011 1.023 .0140 
  (0.0179) (0.02) (0.017) 
       
Self Identification (Reference: As Afghan) 
By ethnicity 0.828** 0.825** -.192*** 
  (0.0494) (0.0531) (0.055) 
       
By tribe 0.896 1.078 -.012 
  (0.096) (0.12) (0.094) 
       
Other 0.745* 0.824 -.265* 
  (0.105) (0.128) (0.128) 
       
As Muslim 0.906 0.873 -.088 
  (0.0928) (0.0955) (0.094) 
       
Life Improvement 1.154*** 1.190*** .160*** 
  (0.0303) (0.0341) (0.024) 
       
Security Improved 2.026*** 2.039*** .720*** 
  (0.0633) (0.0688) (0.029) 
       
Geographic Area 0.923 0.791*** -.130* 
  (0.0535) (0.0512) (0.055) 
       
Ethnicity (Reference: Pashtun) 
Tajik 1.05 1.153** .080 
  (0.0503) (0.0615) (0.045) 
       
Uzbek 1.443*** 1.568*** .381*** 
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  (0.11) (0.145) (0.073) 
       
Hazara 0.709*** 0.834* -.263** 
  (0.06) (0.0768) (0.077) 
       
Other 1.051 1.442*** .134* 
  (0.0772) (0.124) (0.068) 
       
Message Trustworthy 
(Gov.) 1.358
*** 1.362*** .308*** 
  (0.0326) (0.0349) (0.022) 
       
Respect Religion (Gov.) 1.370*** 1.333*** .301*** 
  (0.0352) (0.0348) (0.023) 
       
Corruption Problem 1.092*** 1.147*** .110*** 
  (0.0255) (0.0304) (0.021) 
        
Observations 12020 12020 12020 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 3A.2 Opinion of Government Performance: Alternative Coding of Dependent 
Variable 
  Logit 1 Logit 2 Ologit 
Independent Variables       
Age 1.001 1.001 0.001 
  (0.00155) (0.00146) (0.001) 
       
Gender 0.883** 1.009 -0.047 
  (0.0379) (0.0408) (0.034) 
       
Education 1.052** 1.093*** 0.074*** 
  (0.0193) (0.0186) (0.015) 
       
Self Identification (Reference: As Afghan) 
By ethnicity 0.914 0.958 -0.015 
  (0.0552) (0.0553) (0.049) 
       
By tribe 0.531*** 0.675*** -0.415*** 
  (0.0536) (0.0737) (0.087) 
	 100	
       
Other 1.185 1.105 0.122 
  (0.177) (0.146) (0.112) 
       
As Muslim 0.735** 0.842 -0.230 
  (0.0729) (0.0843) 0.083** 
       
Life Improvement 1.193*** 1.120*** 0.169*** 
  (0.0318) (0.0286) (0.022) 
       
Security Improved 1.562*** 1.551*** 0.465*** 
  (0.0486) (0.0465) (0.026) 
       
Geographic Area 1.066 0.907 0.002 
  (0.0665) (0.0511) (0.048) 
       
Ethnicity (Reference: Pashtun) 
Tajik 0.979 0.717*** -0.146*** 
  (0.0483) (0.0335) (0.040) 
       
Uzbek 1.557*** 0.912 0.103 
  (0.133) (0.0649) (0.061) 
       
Hazara 0.754*** 0.516*** -0.444*** 
  (0.0641) (0.0438) (0.069) 
       
Other 1.478*** 0.751*** 0.014 
  (0.118) (0.0537) (0.059) 
       
Trustworthy Message (Gov.) 1.311*** 1.308*** 0.271*** 
  (0.0316) (0.031) (0.020) 
       
Respect Religion (Gov.) 1.289*** 1.265*** 0.251*** 
  (0.0317) (0.0322) (0.021) 
       
Corruption Problem 1.062* 1.062** 0.068*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0238) (0.019) 
       
Observations 12470 12470 12470 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Appendix – Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.2: Opinion of ISAF (Robustness Check) 
    ISAF_good   ISAF_good_robustcheck 
Independent Variables   Odds Ratio Std. Err.   Odds Ratio Std. Err. 
age  0.999 (0.00197)  0.999 (0.00188) 
gender  0.706*** (0.0393)  0.815*** (0.0430) 
education  1.118*** (0.0256)  1.096*** (0.0237) 
madrassa_ed  0.976 (0.0132)  0.991 (0.0130) 
life_improvement  1.111** (0.0374)  0.990 (0.0332) 
Security (Base: Worse)  1 (.)  1 (.) 
     The Same  1.974*** (0.141)  1.765*** (0.147) 
     Better  1.926*** (0.153)  2.306*** (0.202) 
affected_ops  0.890* (0.0459)  1.077 (0.0537) 
district  1 (0.000217)  1.000 (0.000211) 
Ethnicity (Base: Pashtun)  1 (.)  1 (.) 
     Tajik  1.356*** (0.0856)  1.298*** (0.0777) 
     Uzbek  1.400** (0.146)  1.213* (0.110) 
     Hazara  1.442** (0.184)  1.270* (0.134) 
     Other  1.343** (0.127)  1.068 (0.0974) 
ISAF_message_trust  0.543*** (0.0154)  0.651*** (0.0179) 
ISAF_respect_religion  0.569*** (0.0159)  0.686*** (0.0174) 
police_none  0.730*** (0.0403)  0.757*** (0.0408) 
narmy_none  0.776*** (0.0465)  0.843** (0.0518) 
corrupt_court  0.837*** (0.0326)  0.855*** (0.0314) 
provgov_misuse_power  0.894** (0.0354)  0.933 (0.0359) 
distgov_misuse_power  0.954 (0.0385)  0.953 (0.0370) 
Observations   9264     9264   
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses    
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
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